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INTRODUCTION 
Six years ago, a bankruptcy scholar's suggestion that Chapter 11, the 
Bankruptcy Code's corporate reorganization chapter ,I should be abolished 
would have interested almost no one except perhaps a few other 
academicians. 2 Even then, at the height of the takeover boom, many 
1. Chapter 11 comprises §§ 1101-1174 of the Bankruptcy Code, Pub. L. No. 95-
598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)). Hereinafter, 
Bankruptcy Code provisions will be cited as, "Bankruptcy Code § _." 
2. Douglas Baird made precisely this suggestion. See Douglas G. Baird, The 
Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986) [hereinafter 
Baird, Corporate Reorganizations]. This article and his work with Thomas Jackson 
precipitated a much-cited debate between Baird and Elizabeth Warren, see Elizabeth 
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observers predicted that Chapter 11 would be increasingiy important for 
large, high profile corporations. But nearly everyone assumed, with a 
few caveats, that Chapter 11 worked just fine. What a difference a year 
or two makes. 
In the intervening time, lawyers , business people, and the general 
public have witnessed a series of highly visible companies disintegrate in 
bankruptcy. There have been successful reorganizations, of course, but 
many see cases like the Eastern Airlines bankruptcy as more the order of 
the day. Eastern had a somewhat shaky track record when it entered 
Chapter 11, but had been a prominent air! ine for many years. Eastern 
deteriorated rapidly and was eventually liquidated. 3 Another major 
company, LTV Corporation, entered Chapter 11 several years before 
Eastern and, after more than six years , still has not seen the light of 
postbankruptcy day. 
In a sense, then, Michael Bradley and Michael Rosenzweig simply 
captured the spirit of the moment when they boldly proclaimed in an 
article published in March 1992 that the time to eliminate Chapter 11 had 
come. 4 Their broadside was particularly timely, coming during a period 
of intense public anger at managers' lavish wages and lifestyles, because, 
in addition to arguing that Chapter 11 does more harm than good, Bradley 
and Rosenzweig conclude that managers are to blame. Even better, they 
purport to back up this thesis with extensive empirical prooe 
Warren , Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775 (1987); Douglas G. Baird , Loss 
Distribution, Forwn Shopping and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 
815 (1987), but did not create nearly so great a stir in the popular media and the 
bankruptcy bar as the Bradley and Rosenzweig article discussed below. 
3 . See, e. g., Claudia MacLachlan , Blame Flies in Demise of Airline, NAT'L L.J., 
May 27, 1991, at 1, 35-36. 
4 . Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, Tlze Untenable Case f or Chapter 11, 
101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992). 
5 . As both Lynn LoPucki and Elizabeth Warren point out in new commentaries 
on the Bradley and Rosenzweig artic le, the empirical analysis proves problematic on 
inspection. Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors 
Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REV. 79 (1992) ; Elizabeth Warren, Th e Untenable 
Casefor Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437 (1992) . Bradley and Rosenzweig 
compare the pre and postbankruptcy stock and bond vaiues of publicly held firms that 
filed under the former Bankruptcy Act , to those that have ftl ed under the 1978 Bankruptcy 
Code. They conclude from their data that firms filin g Chapter 11 petitions under the 
Bankruptcy Code were worth signifi cantly more on the ftling date , but lost a much higher 
percentage of their value while in bankruptcy. Bradley & Rosenzweig , supra note 4, at 
1076-77. However, Bradley and Rosenzweig fail to consider the substantial differences 
between Act and Code debtors . Moreover, courts may well have permitted greater 
deviations from the absolute priority rule in cases under the old Act. LoPucki, supra, at 
94 . Warren questions the accuracy of their data set and suggests several alternative 
explanations for their results. Warren , supra, at 455-67. 
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If the current reorganization regime does not work, the obvious 
question that arises is, what should done? Bradley and Rosenzweig would 
replace Chapter 11 with a "contingent equity" regime providing for the 
automatic cancellation of a corporation's stock in the event of any default. 
At least four other commentators have offered their own alternatives to 
Chapter 11, ranging from Barry Adler's modified version of the Bradley 
and Rosenzweig proposal, 6 to Doug Baird's consideration of the efficacy 
of mandatory auctions/ and James Bowers's suggestion that we should 
jettison Chapter 11 altogether and simply leave the parties to their own 
devices. 8 The one thing the proposals have in common is their insistence 
on the need for a much more market-oriented regime. 
A central purpose of this Article is to bring the various proposals 
together and to scrutinize each in some detail. I begin this process in Part 
I with a brief overview of the proposals and the theoretical background 
from which they have emerged. Having introduced the proposed 
alternatives to Chapter 11 in Part I, I examine each in turn in Part II. 
The discussion reveals that each of the proposals has significant flaws and 
suggests that none is clearly superior to Chapter 11 for all kinds of 
debtors. 
In Part III, I shift gears and address the more practical question of 
whether any of the proposals, or perhaps a different proposal, is likely to 
be adopted by Congress. The standard public choice story suggests that 
managers and members of the corporate and bankruptcy bars are 
sufficiently well organized and have so much at stake, that they will 
thwart any attempted reform of Chapter 11. The problem with this story 
is that it not only ignores the influence of interest groups such as 
institutional investors, but it also fails to consider the importance of 
widespread populist antipathy toward both managers and the corporate 
and bankruptcy bars. Although my public choice analysis suggests that 
reform is at least possible once these crucial factors are taken into 
account, I use a modified version of Karl Polanyi's thesis in The Great 
Transfonnation9 to argue that none of the current proposals is I ike! y ever 
to make it through Congress. Polanyi posited that the state will inevitably 
act to prevent the market from becoming self-regulating. With the limited 
exception of mandatory auctions, all of the proposals aspire to self-
regulation; in the search for a pure market solution to the problems of 
Chapter 11, each under appreciates the importance of the courts in the 
6. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
7 . See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 
9. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944). 
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insolvency context 10 and, as a result, would almost certainly prove 
unattractive to Congress. 
The first three parts of the Article are largely destructive, raising 
questions about each of the new proposals and then casting doubt on the 
suggestion that any might one day be adopted. I change tacks a final time 
in Part IV. In that part, I argue that while the proposals themselves 
should not be adopted, they do suggest ways in which the current 
bankruptcy laws should be radically amended. I contend in particular that 
the drafters should split Chapter 11 into two chapters, one dealing with 
close and the other with nonclosely held corporations. My proposal is, 
in a sense, a call to return to the format of the old Bankruptcy Act, and 
an endorsement of at least one aspect of an early version of the 
bankruptcy legislation that nearly passed Congress in 1992. Both 
contemplated separate treatment of different kinds of corporations. 
Unfortunately, both were deeply flawed. I conclude by showing the 
problems of each, and why my two corporation system would improve on 
both. 
I. BANKRUPTCY THEORY AND THE EMERGING NEW ORDER 
The proposed alternatives to Chapter 11 can and perhaps should be 
seen as the second generation of the path-breaking work on bankruptcy 
theory done by Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson in the 1980s. I 
therefore begin by describing Baird and Jackson's creditors' bargain 
model of bankruptcy, and the critiques that eventually led to the new 
proposals. This paves the way for a short synopsis of each of the 
proposals at the end of this part. 
A. The Creditors' Bargain Model 
Bankruptcy dramatically changes relationships among a debtor and 
its creditors. In the absence of bankruptcy, an individual creditor's rights 
against the debtor are governed by contract, together with (mostly) state 
debt collection laws . Bankruptcy calls a halt to these individual 
10. I refer to the "insolvency regime ~ or the " insolvency context~ throughout 
the Article and often use these terms as synonyms for Chapter 11 , bankruptcy, or one of 
the proposed alternatives to Chapter 11 . Strictly speaking, the term is not accurate, since 
solvent fl1Tl1s are not precluded from filing a Chapter 11 petition. Nevertheless, the term 
is convenient, and most fl1Tl1s that file for bankruptcy are in fact insolvent. See, e.g., 
Lynn M . LoPucki & William C. Whitford , Bargaining over Equity's Share in the 
BanJ:ruptcyReorganizationofLarge, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125, 
141-43 (1990) [hereinafter , LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share]. 
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The creditors' bargain model quickly assumed an almost caiionical 
status and, in consequence, became the subject of immediate and sustained 
critical attention. Much of the initial questioning of the model stemmed 
from the observation that, as a descriptive matter, bankruptcy deviates 
markedly from the creditors' bargain ideal. Rather than preserving the 
parties' state law entitlements (other than a creditor's right of immediate 
collection), bankruptcy only incompletely honors the priorities of higher 
priority creditors, appearing instead to favor lower priority creditors and 
the debtor. 18 Some commentators have suggested that, if this risk 
sharing is viewed as a form of insurance, it arguably can be reconciled 
with the creditors' bargain model. 19 By contrast, commentators 
unsympathetic to the contractarian nature of the Baird and Jackson 
analysis view bankruptcy's alteration of the parties' prebankruptcy 
priorities as evidence that the creditors' bargain approach is misguided. 
In their view, bankruptcy should, and does, implement important societal 
values not reflected in the creditors' bargain framework. 20 
The most recent contractarian scholarship takes a different tack and 
calls into question Baird and Jackson's central assumption that bankruptcy 
is necessary to solve a common pool or prisoners' dilemma problem. 
18. While the absolute priority rule theoretically protects secured creditors' 
priorities, confmnation of a consensual reorganization plan is only possible if every class 
of claims and interests approves the plan. Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(8). Ensuring 
universal approval frequently requires that higher priority creditors agree to accept less 
than full payment. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate 
Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461,484 (1992). Moreover, 
a secured creditor is not entitled to receive postpetition interest unless it is oversecured. 
!d.; Bankruptcy Code § 506(b). 
19. Robert E. Scott, Through Bankruptcy with the Creditors' Bargain Heuristic, 
53 U. CHI. L. REv . 690 (1986) (proposing a "common disaster" explanation of 
bankruptcy); Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An 
Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV . 155 (1989). 
Jackson and Scott argue that if many debtors (and perhaps low priority creditors) are risk 
averse, debtors may be willing to pay marginally higher interest rates in return for the 
assurance that secured creditors will contribute to any reorganization effort. As with the 
original version of the creditors' bargain heuristic, bankruptcy can be seen as 
implementing an arrangement-here, risk sharing-that the parties themselves would have 
agreed to in the absence of insurmountable coordination costs. I d. at 167-69. As Jackson 
and Scott acknowledge, however, the risk sharing that occurs under the current 
Bankruptcy Code seems poorly tailored to any such insurance goal. I d. at 200-01; Robert 
K. Rasmussen, The Efficiency ofChapter 11, 8 BANKR. DEY. J. 319, 329-31 (1991). 
Moreover, the prospect of risk sharing may distort managers' incentives prior to 
bankruptcy. Barry E . Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV . 439, 
473 (1992) [hereinafter Adler, Risk Allocation] . 
20. Warren, supra note 2; Donald R. Korobkin, Value and Rationaiity in 
Bankruptcy Decisionmaking , 33 WM . & MARY L. REV. 333 (1992); Donald R. Korobkin, 
Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COUJ}.f. L. REV. 717 (1991). 
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remedies 11 and imposes a collectivized debt collection regime in their 
stead . In bankruptcy, creditors must act (and are dealt with by the 
debtor) primarily in classes rather than as individuals. 12 
In the early 1980s, Thomas Jackson offered the first systematic 
attempt to normatively justify bankruptcy's alteration of the individual 
contracts entered into by a debtor and its creditors. 13 Jackson and his 
frequent co-author, Douglas Baird, base their conception, the creditors' 
bargain model, on what they describe as a "hypothetical bargain" among 
creditors. 14 Were creditors able to bargain among themselves ex ante, 
Baird and Jackson argue, they would agree to restrain from exercising 
their individual collection rights in the event the debtor encountered 
financial difficulties. Otherwise, a costly "race to the courthouse" would 
develop, with each creditor rushing to enforce its collection rights at the 
first sign of trouble, lest other creditors get there first and levy on all of 
the debtor's available assets. In their zeal to ensure satisfaction of their 
particular debts, the creditors might dismember a debtor that, on 
reflection, all would agree is worth more to the creditors collectively as 
a going concern. 15 
Baird and Jackson argue that creditors are too widely dispersed to 
bargain effectively among themselves; bankruptcy is therefore necessary 
to implement the bargain to which the parties would have agreed had 
negotiation been possible: in particular, to require that creditors restrain 
from prebankruptcy races to the courthouse. 16 But bankruptcy should 
not alter the parties' state law entitlements in any other way. Both to 
prevent forum shopping and to give secured creditors sufficient incentives 
to participate, the substantive rules in place in bankruptcy should mirror 
those operative outside of bankruptcy. 17 
11. Bankruptcy Code§ 362 imposes an automatic stay on most efforts to co llect 
on a debt owed by the debtor. 
12. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Code§ 1123 (requiring proponent of a reorganization 
plan to designate classes of claims and interests). 
13. See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the 
Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J . 857 (1982). 
14. See, e.g. , THOMAS H . JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY 
LAW (1986); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and 
the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protecrion of 
Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97 (1984) . 
15. Jackson, supra note 13, at 862. 
16. Baird and Jackson describe creditors' predicament in te rms of the familiar 
prisoners' dilemma and common pool puzzles developed by economists. The problem in 
each case is that even rational individuals may make collectively suboptimal dec isions if 
they are unable to coordinate their choices. !d. 
17. !d. at 867-70. 
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One branch of this criticism argues that the common pool characterization 
fo cuses only on creditors, whereas in reality the debtor plays a crucial 
role in the process. 2 1 Another suggests that even if there were a risk 
that creditors would dismember a viable debtor, the parties themselves 
could prevent this result tiuough the skillful use of secured credit 
arrangements. 22 Much more than their predecessors, these critiques go 
to the very heart of the creditors' bargain model justification of 
bankruptcy. 
B. Ihe New Proposals to Replace Chapter 11 
As discussed earlier, Michael Bradley and Michael Rosenzweig drew 
national attention early last year when they argued that Chapter 11 should 
be abolished. On a theoretical level, the recent commentary discussed 
above-in particular, the doubts it casts on the most important normative 
justification for bankruptcy-under! ies their and other recent calls for an 
end to Chapter 11. But this in itself cannot explain the sudden public 
interest, and debate, as to the future of the current bankruptcy regime. 23 
The intensity of the controversy stems from an increasingly widespread 
perception not only that Chapter 11 is unnecessary , but that it also may 
have affirmatively harmful consequences for many firms. 
Two central concerns help explain why Chapter 11 is suddenly more 
out of fashion than Nero. The first, and most obvious, issue is the 
tremendous costs of Chapter 11. The attorneys' and accountants' fees 
alone can be substantial in a lengthy case, and Chapter 11 creates 
significant indirect costs, such as disruption and lost opportunities, as 
well. 24 It does not take too many Chapter 11s like the Eastern Airlines 
21 . James W . Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law: 
Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure , 88 MICH . L. REV . 2097, 
2111-13(1990) [hereinafterBowers , Murphy'sLaw] . See alsoJ amesW. Bowers , Whither 
What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Th eory, and the Elementary Economics 
of Loss Distribution , 26 GA. L. REv. 27 (1991) [hereina fter Bowers, Loss Distribution] . 
22 . Randal C . Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior and Common Pools , 59 U. 
CHJ . L. REv . 645 (1 992). 
23 . For examples of recent articles about the Bradley & Rosenzweig proposal, see 
Emily Barker, Pair Puts Spotlight on Chapter 11 's Flaws , AM . LAW., May 1992, at 119; 
Peter Passell , Economic Scene: Fun, Games, Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES , Apr. 29 , 1992, 
at D2; Allen R. Myerson, Rethinking the Law that Gives Golden Eggs After the Goose is 
Dead , N.Y. TIMES , Apr. 5, 1992, at E2 ; Michelle Singletary, Panel Votes to Fonn 
Bankruptcy Study Body , WASH. POST, Mar. 20 , 1992 , at F1; Wade Lambe rt & Milo 
Geyelin, Bankruptcy Lawyers Dispute Call for Scrapping Chapter 11 Process , WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 19 , 1992 , at B5. 
24 . Estimates of the direct costs o f bankruptcy range to as high as 25 % of a 
debto r' s asset value, see DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJ ORIE GIRTH , BANKR UPTCY: 
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fiasco to raise widespread questions as to whether these costs generate 
sufficient offsetting benefits. Second, Chapter 11 may also have negative 
effects even before a firm files for bankruptcy relief. Commentators have 
focused in particular on managers' incentives. Because it limits the 
downside of any business disaster, they reason, Chapter 11 encourages 
managers to issue excessive debt and otherwise take excessive risks.25 
What should be done if we conclude that Chapter 11 has failed of its 
essential purposes? Almost all of the recent literature argues for the 
adoption of one or more of four general alternatives in place of the 
current regime: 1) auctions; 2) implementation of a predetermined 
bankruptcy capital structure; 3) automatic cancellation of shareholders' 
interests; and 4) elimination of bankruptcy altogether. I devote the 
remainder of this part to a brief discussion of the various proposals and 
of the advantages they appear to offer over Chapter 11. 
1. THE BANKRUPTCY AUCTION 
In its current form, Chapter 11 combines the decisions as to how a 
firm's assets should be deployed-i.e., should the firm be liquidated or 
reorganized, and if reorganized, in what form-with those concerning the 
parties' claims and their priorities vis-a-vis one another. This 
intertwining of the asset deployment and claimant entitlement issues 
creates two significant and related costs. First, parties' views about 
entitlement may color their perceptions concerning asset deployment. For 
instance, unsecured creditors may support an inferior reorganization plan 
if it offers them a larger piece of the overall pie. 26 Second, inability to 
PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 263 (1971), but other commentators provide substantially 
lower estimates. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and 
Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285 (1990) (average of 3%). For 
discussions of the indirect costs of bankruptcy, see Adler, Risk Allocation, supra note 19, 
at 465-66; Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market 
Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L. REv. 295, 313 (1989). 
25. Adler, Risk Allocation, supra note 19, at 473-74; Bradley & Rosenzweig, 
supra note 4, at 1047. Bradley and Rosenzweig attribute far greater evils to the managers 
of bankrupt firms, suggesting not only that their decision-making incentives are 
problematic, but that managers afflllTiatively divert assets away from the other 
constituencies of the flllTI. ld. at 1052, 1075. The problem with this assertion is that 
Bradley and Rosenzweig offer absolutely no evidence of how managers are able to 
perpetrate such a heist, and the observations of other scholars and practitioners contradict 
their management looting thesis. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 5, at 94-97. The 
frequency with which managers are displaced in Chapter 11 makes the thesis particularly 
suspect. !d. at 95 (high managementtumover); Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards and 
Blockholders, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 355 (1990) (same). 
26. I discuss this problem in somewhat more detail in an earlier article. Skeel, 
supra note 18, at 502-03. See also Baird & Jackson, supra note 14, at 108. 
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resolve asset deployment issues until heterogeneous groups of claimants 
thrash out their entitlement disputes is costly and can all but paralyze a 
firm for the duration of a Chapter 11 case. Many observers point to this 
second concern, the need for negotiation among heterogeneous creditors, 
as Chapter 11 's single greatest flaw. 27 
Douglas Baird was perhaps the first to suggest that Chapter 11 might 
profitably be jettisoned in favor of an auction, at least if the debtor is a 
large, publicly held firm. 28 The chief virtue of a mandatory bankruptcy 
auction is that it would separate the deployment and entitlement decisions. 
Under such a regime, a court or a trustee would sell the bankrupt firm to 
the highest bidder, thus ideally moving the assets to their most valued use 
quickly and inexpensively. This would enable the court to determine 
priority and other issues separately, and simply give the claimants their 
share of an extant pot of cash. Replacing the hypothetical sale of Chapter 
11 with an actual sale might therefore both improve the quality of the 
asset deployment decision and decrease the deadweight costs of 
bankruptcy. 
2. IMPLEMENTATION OF A PREPLANNED CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
Both Alan Schwartz and Robert Rasmussen have recently suggested 
that firms should be permitted to opt out of bankruptcy if they so 
choose. 29 If Chapter 11 were optional, rather than being a firm's only 
choice of insolvency regime, debtors might devise their own alternatives 
to bankruptcy; firms might, for instance, provide for a special 
"bankruptcy capital structure" in their debt contracts or their charter, 
27. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Bankruprcy and Debr: A New Model for Corporale 
Reorganizarion, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 538-40 (1983) [hereinafter Roe, A New Mode[]; 
Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, & John Moore, The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, at 
8-9 (1992) (unpublished manuscript). One way to address this problem is to narrow the 
range of potential bargaining, so as to minimize the likelihood of strategic behavior by the 
parties. Several of the rules I propose in Part IV would have precisely this effect. 
28. Baird, Corporare Reorganizarion.s, supra note 2, at 139-41; Adler, Risk 
Allocation, supra note 19, at 488. Mark Roe had previously proposed a partial auction 
approach, suggesting that courts might sell a portion of the stock of a Chapter 11 debtor 
to the market as a means of determining the value of the finn, Roe, A New Model, supra 
note 27. Several years after the Roe and Baird articies, Lucian Bebchuk offered an 
options-based approach to the reorganization process. Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New 
Approach to Corporare Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REv. 775 , 785-88 (1988). 1 
discuss the Bebchuk proposal (as incorporated into another recent auction proposal) at 
greater length infra Section II.A.2. 
29. Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Conrracts, 36 J.L. & ECON. 
(forthcoming 1993); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to 
Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REv. 51 (1992). 
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consisting of preplanned adjustments that would be triggered by financial 
distress. 30 Rasmussen suggests that even firms opting for Chapter 11 in 
its current form could take advantage of this flexibility. A firm wishing 
to make use of the new value exception to the absolute priority rule, for 
instance, could specify in advance how much equity holders must 
contribute and what portion of the finn's stock they would receive in 
return. 31 
Use of a predetermined capital structure would ideally simplify both 
the asset deployment and the claimant entitlement decisions, since the 
parties would make these decisions in advance, at a time when their 
interests are more likely to be congruent. The strategy also seems largely 
to obviate the need for judicial involvement in the insolvency process. 
3. AUTOMATIC CANCELLATION OF SHAREHOLDERS' INTERESTS: 
THE CONTINGENT/CHAMELEON EQUITY PROPOSAL 
The Bradley and Rosenzweig proposal, which has been modified and 
refined by Barry Adler as a "chameleon equity" approach32 (I will refer 
to the proposals together as "contingent/chameleon equity"), boasts 
similar virtues. These commentators argue for automatic cancellation of 
shareholders' interests in the event of a default. Upon cancellation of 
shareholders' interests, the next highest class of claimants would replace 
them as the firm's shareholders.33 
Bradley and Rosenzweig envision that a firm in danger of defaulting 
on its obligations will raise money by issuing equity. Only when the 
firm's liabilities exceed its assets, and its stock has therefore become 
worthless, will the firm be unable to sell equity. The firm's subsequent 
default will reflect true insolvency, thus justifying the elimination of its 
current stockholders' interests.34 
30. Neither Schwartz nor Rasmussen suggests that firms should be required to 
devise a finn-specific insolvency capital structure. Rather, Schwartz attempts to 
demonstrate that firms could plausibly replicate the virtues of bankruptcy through contract; 
Rasmussen argues for a menu of poss ible insolvency regimes which would give firms, as 
one of their options, the right to develop their own tailor-made insolvency regime. 
31. Rasmussen , supra note 29, at 110-11. 
32. Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate 
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993) [hereinafter Adler, Financial and Political 
Theories] . Adler 's article, which was written contemporaneously with Bradley and 
Rosenzweig's , cures many of the more prominent defects of the contingent equity 
proposal. See, e.g., infra note 87 . 
33 . Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32 ; Bradley & 
Rosenzweig , supra note 4, at 1078-86. 
34. Brad ley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1081-82. 
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One potential benefit of automatic cancell ation is its effect on 
managers' incentives. Because managers cannot look forward to the '"soft 
landing" provided by Chapter 11 in its current form, they will be less 
inclined to gamble excessively with the firm's assets. Like the 
implementation of a predetermined capital structure alternative discussed 
above, automatic cancellation also dramatically simplifies the asset 
deployment and claimant entitlement questions by resolving them in 
advance, and all but eliminates the role of the court. 
4. ELIMINATION OF CHAPTER 11 ALTOGETHER 
Some commentators have at least tentatively suggested that Chapter 
11 should be eliminated altogether and that creditors and their debtors 
should simply be left to the state law collection regime.35 James Bowers 
frames such a suggestion as a critique of the common pool metaphor 
underlying Baird and Jackson's creditors' bargain mode\. 36 As discussed 
earlier, Bowers argues that this metaphor ignores the role of the debtor 
as the most efficient liquidator of its estate. In his view, bankruptcy's 
"equal treatment of similarly situated creditors" norm, and its prohibition 
of preferences, may interfere with debtors' efforts efficiently to 
distinguish among their creditors in responding to financial crises. 37 
Thus, abolishing Chapter 11 not only would save the direct and indirect 
costs of a bankruptcy proceeding, it might also facilitate more efficient 
adjustments by debtors in the event L.1at disaster strikes. 
II. WHAT A WoNDERFUL WoRLD IT WoULD BE? 
In this part, I take a closer and more critical look at each of the 
proposals described in Part I. My aim throughout is to present a fuller 
picture of the consequences the proposals would have and imp! icitly to 
ask, with respect to each, whether it offers an improvement over current 
Chapter 11. In subsequent parts, I will consider whether Congress is 
35. Bowers, Murphy's Law, supra note 21; Bowers, Loss Distribution, supra note 
21. Bowers's approach differs from Robert Rasmussen's "menu approach" to bankruptcy, 
Rasmussen, supra note 29, in that whereas Bowers appears at times to assume that debtors 
would forgo bankruptcy altogether were it abolished, Rasmussen suggests that finns would 
devise their own alternatives. To facilitate this process, Rasmussen argues that Congress 
should give the parties several preformulated options, including the current Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 11 regimes, as well as permitting them to create their own alternative. 
36 . Bowers, Murphy's Law, supra note 21, at 2108-13. 
37. Jd.; Bowers, Loss Distribution, supra note 21, at 33-35. 
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likely to adopt any of the proposals, and I will suggest an alternative 
blueprint for change. 
A. Chinks in the Case for Mandatory Auctions 
1. A WORLD THAT ONLY ALLOWED AUCTIONS 
Mandatory auctions intuitively seem to offer tremendous savings in 
comparison with the cost of a protracted Chapter 11 case. An auction can 
move the assets of a financially troubled firm to the highest valuing user 
much more quickly, and can prevent asset deployment decisions from 
bogging down in the parties' negotiations over their respective 
entitlements . But on closer inspection the promise of mandatory auctions 
is far I ess clear. 
The chief problem with the mandatory auction proposal-one which 
largely renders moot the question whether auctions would be any less 
costly than Chapter I P8-is that it simply would not work as intended 
in the insolvency context. First, auctions are likely to be plagued by an 
absence of potential bidders. At least with respect to publicly held 
debtors, few bidders could raise financing sufficiently quickly to 
participate actively in an auction market. 39 While the existence of an 
auction market might itself generate increased interest in the financial 
community, the likelihood of a truly competitive market seems remote. 
This dilemma is exacerbated by the fact that the most likely bidders for 
a corporation frequently are firms in the same industry. If the problems 
that led to the debtor's demise were industry-wide, few or none of these 
firms would be able to bid.40 Even more than with the corporate 
38. The direct costs of an auction regime would include not only the costs (such 
as advertising, hiring an investment banker, and providing information to potential 
bidders) of conducting the auction, but also the cost of resolving the parties' respective 
entitlements , since auctions would not eliminate this aspect of bankruptcy. See, e.g., 
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD , REVISITING AUCTIONS IN CHAPTER 11 (Chicago Law and Economics 
Working Paper No. 7 (2d Series) 1992). Similarly, whil~ auctions appear to minimize 
the indirect costs of bankruptcy, they might s imply shift these costs forwa rd in time. 
Whereas fmns' attention currently is diverted, and opportunities are lost, during 
bankruptcy, the prospect of an auction might cause managers to devote all of their energy 
to forestalling bankruptcy in the event of fmancial difficulties , thus distracting the firm 
prior to bankruptcy. Jd. In short, a comparison of the costs o f auctions, to those of the 
current regime , proves inconclusive at best. 
39. Roe, supra note 27, at 573; Aghion et al. , supra note 27, at 8. 
40. See Andrei Shliefer & Robert W. Vishny , Liquidation Values and Debt 
Capacity: A Marker Equilibriwn Approach, 47 J. FIN . 1343 (1992). 
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takeover market, a very small number of players would dominate the 
auction process in bankruptcy. 41 
Second, even in an otherwise competitive market, the potentially 
enormous costs of gathering and analyzing information, of choosing an 
appropriate capital structure for the firm, and of the bidding process itself 
would deter many bidders. Each bidder knows that these costs will be 
lost for all except the winning bidder and that, if the auction is hotly 
contested, every bidder may end up with losses. As a result, many 
bidders will decide (perhaps after a brief exploratory effort) not to make 
a serious effort to investigate the firm and to enter the bidding process.42 
The chilling effect of bidding costs further calls into question the 
I ike! ihood of an effective auction process. 43 
Robert Gertner and Randal Picker have recently pointed out an 
additional problem with mandatory auctions in bankruptcy. The financial 
41. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Antitrust and the Market for Corporate Control, 
77 CALIF. L. REv. 1365 , 1379 (1989) (market for corporate control is more similar to 
market for art than to a thick competitive market due the relative dearth of prospective 
buyers for any given company at a particular time). A recent empirical study by LoPucki 
and Whitford reinforces the concern as to the number of likely bidders. LoPucki and 
Whitford found that, in the auctions currently taking place in Chapter 11, there frequently 
is only one bidder. See Lynn M . LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate 
Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 
U. PA . L. REV. 669, 764-65 (1993). 
42. See, e.g., Aghion eta!., supra note 27, at 10. The dilemma outlined in the 
text is somewhat analogous to the "first mover" problem. The first mover problem stems 
from bidders' perception that, once one bidder has incurred the costs of investigating a 
firm and preparing a bid, that bidder will bid up to the full value of the fmn in the event 
of a competitive auction . Subsequent bidders may thus face a "lose-lose" situation : If 
they bid the value of the fmn or less, they will lose the bidding; and if they bid enough 
to win, they will have overpaid. As a result, subsequent bidders will refrain from 
bidding, and the first bidder will win with a low bid. See, e.g. , Adler, Financial and 
Political Theories , supra note 32, at 321. There is reason to doubt that the first bidder 
will get a completely accurate picture of the firm's value even after investigation 
(especially if management is uncooperative); moreover, the first mover problem is likely 
to arise only in the "common values" context, that is, where the assets have the same 
value for all potential bidders. Furthe r, the problem could be minimized in bankruptcy 
by giving multiple bidders equal access to the fmn, and requiring that bids be submitted 
simultaneously. Nevertheless, the ultimate effect in bankruptcy is likely to be the same: 
Few bidders will come forward in any given auction. 
43 . Note that, even if bidders ignored the risks discussed in the text, and did in 
fact bid competitively, an auction reg ime still would be problematic. Rather than paying 
too little for a debtor corporation, the winning bidder might frequently pay too much . 
See, e.g., BernardS. Black, Bidder Overpaymenr in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REv. 597 
(1989) (discussing the "winner's curse" problem in the takeover context); ERIC 
RAsMUSSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION : AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 252 
(1989). This might force winners to canniba lize the company, and would significantly 
increase the li..l.::elihood of a subsequent return to bankruptcy. 
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statements of a firm experiencing financial distress give a misleading 
picture of the firm, due to the fact that managers frequently take unusual 
actions in an effort to forestall barlkruptcy-managers will have preferred 
some creditors and left others unpaid, for instance, and otl-)erwise juggled 
their cash flow .44 In contrast to bankruptcy, which creates a "breathing 
space" during which creditors and third parties can observe the debtor 
under somewhat more normal conditions, a mandatory auction would 
require bidders to make their bids almost immediately. The atypical 
nature of the firm's activities in the period before the auction would 
further distort the bidding process; it might also force the winning bidder 
to postpone or forego potential opportunities until she has time to observe 
the firm in operation. 
Because small and medium-sized firms tend to be local or regional 
in scope, do not regularly supply financial information to the markets, and 
are most effective if their owners also manage the firm, the limitations of 
an auction regime would be exacerbated in this context. Moreover, 
bidders' realizations that the success of a close corporation usually 
depends upon the continued involvement of its current managers, and that 
the managers would refuse to stay on board unless they retained their 
ownership interest, would significantly dampen their incentive to bid. In 
short, mandatory auctions are problematic even for publicly held 
corporations and seem wholly implausible as an alternative to Chapter 11 
for smaller corporations. 
2. AGHION, HART, AND MOORE: THE OPTIONS ALTERNATIVE 
Aghion, Hart, and Moore have recently proposed a modified version 
of the mandatory auction proposal, one which uses an options scheme 
originally proposed by Lucian Bebchuk, in an effort to remedy several 
defects of a pure auction regime. 45 In an options regime, the bankruptcy 
judge or other official would begin by determining the amounts and 
respective priorities of all of the claims and interests in the financially 
troubled firm. The court would distribute all of the firm's stock (subject 
to redemption) to its senior creditors in lieu of their claims, and members 
of each lower class would be given options to purchase a pro rata share 
of the stock temporarily held by senior creditors. A second priority 
creditor could exercise her option to purchase stock by paying her pro 
rata portion of the senior debt; a third priority creditor could do so by 
paying her pro rata portion of the senior debt plus her pro rata share of 
44. Robert Gertner & Randal C . Picker, Bankruptcy and the Allocation of Control 
(1992) (un published manuscript). 
45 . Aghion et al. , sup ra note 27. 
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the second priority debt; and so on. 46 The proposal contemplates that 
lower priority creditors and shareholders would exercise tl)eir options 
only if they felt the firm was worth more L1an the sum of all superior 
claims. Thus , L1e process would ideally put stock in the hands of the true 
residual claimants of the finn , and provide for payment in full of the 
firm's higher priority creditors. 
In addition to overseeing the options process, the judge 
simultaneously would take bids for the firm. Both insiders, such as the 
finn's managers, and third parties could bid, and bids need not be in cash 
or contemplate payment to the new shareholders to qualify .47 Thus, the 
current managers could offer to continue running the company and 
propose that the new shareholders simply retain their stock, just as a third 
party could offer to buy the firm from its shareholders in cash. Once the 
bids were in, the shareholders would vote for whichever proposal they 
found most attractive. In th.e view of Aghion, Hart, and Moore, the 
entire process could be completed in three or four months.48 
The principal advantage of the options alternative lies in its opening 
up of the bidding process. By allowing both cash and noncash bids, the 
options approach reduces the likelihood that only one bidder will bid, 
since entry would not be limited to bidders capable of financing an 
outright sale. It also reintroduces the possibility that the firm could 
reorganize under current management without the intervention of a sale, 
thus retaining the chief benefit of Chapter 11, yet without sacrificing the 
disciplining effect that the prospect of an auction has on managers' 
behavior prior to bankruptcy: Only if management could persuade the 
new shareholders to support such a plan, in preference to all of the other 
bids, would it win out. 
The most obvious problem with the options approach, as with the 
Bebchuk proposal upon which it is based, is that the distribution and 
exercise of options that the scheme envisions would only work effectively 
in a perfectly efficient market. 49 Even if claimants could accurately 
predict the value of the firm (an extremely problematic assumption, 
46. !d. at 16-18; Bebchuk, supra note 28. 
47. Aghion et al., supra note 27, at 14-15. 
48 . !d. at 14, 17-18 . 
49 . Aghion, Hart, and Moore anticipate this prob lem with their proposal, and 
suggest four alternative means of allocating equity . Unfortunately, the alternatives are, 
if anything , more problematic than the option scheme. !d. at 24-25. Two of the 
alternatives-allocating equity in proportion to the face value of the claims against a finn, 
and simply allocating all equity to secured creditors-are arbitrary and would c reate huge 
strategic behavior problems. The third and fou rth, basing the allocation on the highest 
cash bid received or on the valuation of an outside investment bank , a re only marginally 
more l.ik:ely to yield an appropriate allocation . 
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particularly m u'1e insolvency context) and, based on their prediction, 
make into nned decisions as to whether to exercise, the proposal forces 
L.'1em to contribute new cash to the firm if ti-}ey wish to receive stock. 
Many claimants may have difficulty raising t..l-Je necessary cash; 50 one 
suspects, especially in the small firm context, that these claimants would 
simply let their options lapse if they have aJlY doubts about the value of 
their claim. 51 
Moreover, a court could not begin distributing stock options to the 
parties until after it had resolved the parties' entitlement disputes; nor 
could it open the bidding process prior to this point (despite the proposal's 
suggestion to the contrary), since shareholder and creditor bidders could 
not bid until they knew their status within the firm. Untangling the 
parties' entitlements would significantly delay the auction, often to a date 
well beyond the four monbis the proposal predicts for the entire process. 
Finally, although the options approach does expand the bidding 
process, its auctions still would suffer from a serious lack of outside 
bidders, since industry-wide financial difficulties would create the same 
problems in this context as they would for the traditional auction 
approach. In addition, other potential bidders might decline to participate 
for fear that, because the firm's managers also are likely to be bidders, 
the managers may and probably would stonewall outsiders who sought to 
acquire detailed information about the firm. 
In short, the options approach offers a valuable twist on the 
mandatory auction regime, but it is far from a perfect solution to the ills 
of Chapter 11. 
B. A Closer Look at ?replanned Adjustments to the Capital 
Structure 
Preplanned adjustments represent an important departure from the 
auction-based proposals discussed in the previous section. By deciding 
its response to financial crisis in advance, the firm eliminates almost all 
of the direct costs of bankruptcy. Such a regime obviates both the need 
for an ex post judicial (as in current Chapter 11) or market (as with an 
50. The problem is one of transaction costs, and is analogous to the familiar 
observation in contract law that transaction costs may preclude parties from bargaining 
around an inappropriate default rule . See , e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps 
in Incomplete ConJracts: An Economic Theory of DefaulJ Rules , 99 YALE L.J. 87, 109-11 
(1989). 
51. Aghion, Hart, and Moore suggest that the problem could be alleviated by the 
development of a market for the parties' options, but the likelihood of a competitive 
options market seems negligible for small and medium sized firms, and problematic even 
with respect to pub licly held debtors. 
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auction) valuation, and the need for costly ex post bargaining among the 
parties. In effect, we shift with this proposal52 from a partially market-
based alternative, to an entirely market-based one. 
Two related defects raise serious questions about the proposal, 
however. First, the costs of negotiating a capital structure in advance 
could outweigh, and at the least would reduce, the ex post benefits.53 
A debtor would incur these costs even if shifting to the special capital 
structure never became necessary. 54 Only if insolvency were relatively 
likely, or the costs of negotiation low, would preplanned adjustments 
seem a promising solution to the inefficiencies of current Chapter 11. 
Even if these conditions were present, the firm would need to consider 
whether suppliers and other third parties might be hesitant to do business 
with a firm that has already crafted a tailor-made framework for dealing 
with its own insolvency. 
Second, choosing an insolvency capital structure in advance requires 
the parties to predict the future. If the firm guessed wrong about the 
likely source of financial difficulties, changed significantly between its 
inception and the time it encountered trouble, or both, the special 
insolvency structure could prove wholly ineffective. To be sure, the 
parties could attempt to adjust their prearranged structure midstream in 
an effort to address changed conditions, but negotiations of this sort 
would be costly and frequently unsuccessful. 55 In short, the initial 
negotiating costs and the possibility that midstream adjustments might 
become necessary would significantly limit the usefulness of preplanned 
adjustments for many, and perhaps almost all, firms. 
52. As noted earlier, neither Rasmussen nor Schwartz argues that debtors should 
be required to adopt a finn-specific capital structure. Rather, they suggest that some 
debtors might do so if given the opportunity. 
53. Even if a debtor were to adopt a preplanned adjustment strategy unilaterally, 
she still would incur both the costs of devising an appropriate framework, and the costs 
of persuading current and future creditors to agree to the plan. 
54. Adler, Financial and Political T7Jeories, supra note 32, at 322. 
55 . See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 
67 VA. L. REv. 1089 (1981). Rasmussen's response to the possibility of midstream 
changes by a debtor in its choice from a "menu" of possible insolvency regimes is 
hampered by closely analogous problems and therefore is not a solution to the dilemma. 
Rasmussen, supra note 29, at 117-18. Rasmussen argues that unanimous creditor consent 
should be required as a prerequisite to any menu selection change that could be the result 
of strategic behavior by the debtor. Alteration of a tailor-made insolvency structure would 
inevitably fit this definition. Thus, the holdout and negotiation costs discussed in the text 
would always come into play. 
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C. Another Look at Contingent/Chameleon Equity 
The contingent/chameleon equity proposal proffered by Bradl ey and 
Rosenzweig, and by Adler, can be seen as an off-the-rack version of 
prearranged capital structure. Simply committing to cancel current equity 
in the event of default, as these commentators propose, saves the parties 
the costs of negotiating a firm-specific insolvency capital structure and 
appears to address the twin goals of disciplining management and 
avoiding the expense of a prolonged bankruptcy proceeding. 56 The 
proposal also would introduce significant costs, however. Given the 
particular prominence of this proposal, I discuss the costs in some detail 
below. 
1. THE LIQUIDITY PROBLEM 
Initial cnticism has focused upon Bradley and Rosenzweig's 
suggestion that the cancellation of equity would rarely be triggered by 
premature defaults, as one might fear. So long as the firm is solvent, its 
managers could solve any cash flow problems by issuing additional 
equity . Critics have pointed out that this proposal, like the options 
alternative discussed above, assumes that markets function with perfect 
efficiency: Managers must be able to raise money quickly and cheaply, 
in an equity market that assesses accurately the value of the firm. 57 
In the context of publicly held firms, it is at least remotely possible 
that the market would function somewhat as Bradley and Rosenzweig 
imagine. To assess the cost of a contingent/chameleon equity regime, one 
would need to consider the very significant costs of raising equity. 58 
One must also take into account the lagtime between the decision to issue 
equity and actual receipt of the funds . Only if firms could predict a cash 
crunch sufficiently far in advance, would the equity solution prove 
effective .59 A final concern is the risk that cash-strapped firms might be 
forced to sell equity at artificially low, "fire sale"' prices.w Inability to 
56. See sup ra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
57. See , e. g., LoPucki, supra note 5, at 99-101. 
58. See, e. g., HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF 
CORPORATIONS 786-91 (3d ed . 1983) (describing the costs and proced ures of a public 
issuance of securities). 
59. The time problem is likely to be partic ula rly acute if the iss uance is a public 
o ffering and requires compliance with the strictures o f the Securities Act o f 1933. !d. 
60. Firms generally try to time their iss uance of equ ity to favo rable market 
conditions , which need not necessarily be directly co rrelated with the underlying value o f 
the co rporation in question, so as to maximize the price they receive . Se e, e.g., Udayan 
Gupta & Brent Bowe rs, !PO Slump Is Stalling Expansion of Small Busin esses , WALL ST. 
1. , July 2, 1992 , at B2 (describing finm ' decis ions to ho ld off or scale back on plan ned 
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wait even so much as a week or month could prove particularly costly for 
a firm. On the other ha..11d, many large firms do look to the equity 
markets for help with their cash flow problems. General Motors, for 
example, issued equity several times in recent years in response to 
balance sheet problems that had made other forms of financing 
unattractive. To the extent it might force managers to be more judicious 
in their use of debt, and to the extent the option of issuing equity is 
available to address temporary crises, contingent/chameleon equity has 
some initial appeal for a publicly held firm. 
Closely held and other small and medium-sized firms are an entirely 
different story. Issuance of equity is not a viable response to financial 
difficulties for many of these firms, since the transaction costs alone of 
a new public issue are likely to be prohibitive.61 Moreover, investors 
may hesitate to acquire a minority interest in a close corporation, and 
dilution of control would undermine many of the virtues of a closely held 
firm. 62 Downsizing, or sales of nonessential assets , would be equally 
unavailable as alternatives for firms whose value is tied up in crucial 
equipment. In short, the liquidity problem alone raises serious doubts 
about contingent/chameleon equity for all but a narrow slice of publicly 
held firms. The proposal also suffers from additional defects with respect 
to both these and smaller firms. 
2. STRATEGIC BEHA VlOR IN PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATIONS 
A recurring problem with forfeiture rules-rules that eliminate one 
party's interest if a specified triggering event occurs-is that they create 
enormous incentives for strategic behavior. The treatment of express 
conditions in contract law is a particularly good example of this 
phenomenon. Because contract law excuses one party to a contract from 
performing if the other fails to satisfy a condition, regardless of how 
trivial the defect in performance, a nonbreaching party can use the failure 
strategically, as a means of escaping a contract the nonbreaching party has 
come to regret. 63 
offerings rather than sell equity at ftre sale prices). A firm faced with immediate eq uity 
cancellation obviously would be forced to accept whatever price the market would pay. 
61. See Robert E. Scou, A Relational Theory of Secured Transactions, 86 COLUM . 
L. REV. 901, 915-16 (1986) [hereinafter ScoU, A Relational Theory]. 
62 . !d. at 914-15 (describ ing a debtor's incentive to shirk or engage in self-dea ling 
if her ownership share is diminished). 
63 . The case of Intem atio-Rotterdam , Inc . v. River Brand Rice Mills, Inc . , 259 
F .2d 137 (2d Cir. 1958), is illustrati ve . In lnternatio-Rotterdam, a forward contract 
required the seller to delive r 95 ,600 pockets of rice to the buye r the fo llowing December , 
at a contract price of $8. 25 per pocket. De livery was cond itioned on selle r 's receipt of 
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Both Bradley and Rosenzweig, and Adler neglect thi s probiem; yet, 
in publicly held firms, contingent equity would create a serious risk of 
similar opportunism. First, like a nonbreaching party in the express 
condition context, the unsecured creditors of a publicly held firm could 
use u1e equity cancellation rule to divert value from shareholders to 
themselves. To appreciate how this might work , consider a corporation 
that owes $7,000,000 to senior creditors and $2,000,000 to junior 
unsecured creditors, and whose total value is roughly $10,000,000. 
Unsecured creditors would have a tremendous incentive to call for equity 
cancellation if management violated a technical default provision, because 
doing so would give them 100% of the equity of a firm that now had a 
net value of $3,000,000.64 In fact, the bondholders' trustee might even 
be liable for breach of fiduciary duty if she jailed to take advantage of 
this opportunity: In particular, if the firm later experienced serious 
financial difficulties, bondholders might contend that the trustee should 
have taken action earlier, when bondholder values could have been 
salvaged. 
The parties might attempt to curb the threat of strategic behavior by 
adjusting the default provisions in their debt contracts. One might expect 
to see fewer "early warning signal" default provisions, and a greater 
reliance on default provisions (such as payment terms and prohibitions on 
the sale of essential assets) likely to be triggered only in the event of true, 
nontemporary financial reverses, as well as more widespread use of cure 
provisions . Unfortunately, while restricting the breadth of debt contract 
default terms in this fashion might reduce strategic behavior somewhat, 
shipping instructions from buyer two weeks in advance . !d. at 139. By December, the 
market price had risen to $9 .75 per pocket. When the buyer neglected to provide the 
instructions sufficiently early both to give the seller two weeks notice and to allow for 
delive ry before the end of December, the seller immediately rescinded the contract. Id. 
The court found for the seiier , holding that the buyer's failure to strictly comply with the 
conditions of delivery released the seller from its ob ligations . !d. at 140 . 
Not surprisingly, courts have mitigated the harshness of the strict compliance rule 
in some cases by invoking exceptions such as the substantial performance rule, see , e.g. , 
Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921 ), or by finding that the nonbreaching 
party waived the condition. See Universal Builders, Inc . v. Moon Motor Lodge , Inc . , 
244 A.2d 10 (Pa. 1968) . One suspects that, to the extent the parties did not limit the 
contingent/chameleon equity default term or provide fo r a cure period, as discussed 
below, courts would develop similar exceptions so as to aiieviate the regime's more 
problematic consequences. 
64. Thus, the effect of equity cancellation is to increase the value o f the unsecured 
creditors ' inte rest from $2 million to $3 million. U nsccured cred itors' strategic incentives 
might seem to be red uced if they arc significant players in both the equity and the debt 
markets, since equity canceii ation would, in a sense, be robb ing Peter to pay Paul. But 
there wiii always be players in a given firm whose interests are only in debt (and dual 
players might still be tempted if, with respect to the firm in question, they only own debt) . 
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it also would seriously increase the indirect costs of financial 
difficulties. 65 Faced with the prospect of equity cancellation, managers 
would attempt to forestall the day of reckoning by juggling balance sheets 
and foregoing current opportunities; unsecured creditors would be largely 
unable to nip these stalling tactics in the bud. 66 
The second strategic behavior problem arises from the uncertainty as 
to who will manage the firm in the event of an equity cancellation. Adler 
suggests that the firm's new shareholders, its current unsecured creditors, 
should vote on the managers. 67 The vote he envisions would entail 
significant expense, including both the direct costs of holding an election 
and the indirect costs of forgone opportunities during the time before a 
management team is firmly in place. 68 The prospect of these costs, 
together with the prospect of substantial indirect costs prior to default, 
would give unsecured creditors an incentive to strike a deal with the 
firm's current managers. The unsecured creditors might offer a side 
payment, or agree to keep the current managers in place after the equity 
cancellation, in return for the managers' agreement not to make 
extraordinary efforts to forestall default. 69 
In short, in a contingent/chameleon equity regime, unsecured 
creditors could divert value from shareholders to themselves by either 
strategically invoking default provisions in their debt contract or colluding 
with management, or both. 
65. The analysis in the text therefore suggests that, as with an auction regime, 
contingent/chameleon equity would not eliminate, and might not even reduce, the indirect 
costs of insolvency. Instead, it would simply shift these costs forward in time, so that 
costs occurred before rather than during bankruptcy. 
66. Moreover, neither narrower defaults nor even provisions giving the debtor a 
cure period would fully eliminate the risk of strategic behavior. Whereas bankruptcy 
currently acts as a credible threat for debtors, and restrains creditors from declaring 
default opportunistically, unsecured creditors in a contingent/chameleon equity regime 
would have an incentive to enforce strictly any cure provision. 
67. Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32, at 324. 
68. Another major problem with the management decision is the question of who 
will act as the unsecured creditors' agent in connection with the vote. Outside of 
bankruptcy, current management performs this function, as for example by nominating 
a slate of directors and recommending them to shareholders. Current managers obviously 
would be a poor choice of agents for the unsecured creditors in the wake of an equity 
cancellation. Unlike current Chapter 11, which employs committee representation as a 
means of addressing the parties' coordination costs, Bankruptcy Code § 1103, the 
contingent/chameleon equity proposal leaves this issue completely up in the air. 
69. While managers who took such a side payment would be subject to suit for 
breach of their duty of loyalty if they somehow were caught, it is not clear that the ousted 
shareholders would have any direct recourse against the firm's unsecured creditors. In 
other words, the threat of a fiduciary duty suit is likely to be a poor deterrent. 
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3. MONITORlNG GONE AMOK: THE COST OF CREDIT IN 
CLOSELY HELD CONTINGENT/CHAMELEON FIRMS 
487 
As discussed above, the liquidity problem aJone makes 
contingent/chameleon equity aJmost completely implausible for firms that 
are not publicly held. Liquidity is not the only problem in this context, 
however. The proposaJ would aJso undermine the use of secured credit 
and, as a result, significantly increase monitoring and thus overaJl credit 
costs. To appreciate the extent of the problem, it is necessary first to 
briefly describe the role of secured and unsecured credit. 
a. Monitoring and the choice of capital structure 
While the role of debt as a mechanism for disciplining managers and 
thus diminishing their conflicts of interest is well understood ,70 firms' 
use of different kinds of debt-particularly the choice between secured 
and unsecured credit-has proven to be an enduring puzzle. The most 
persuasive explanations for secured credit emphasize the bonding effect 
of security and the monitoring role that secured creditors perform, 
arguing that secured credit offers efficiencies in policing the debtor that 
reduce the overaJl cost of credit. 71 The theories are limited, however, 
70. Because it imposes fixed obligations on a flnn and thus limits excess cash, 
debt gives managers a narrower margin of error. The effect is to increase the likelihood 
that incompetence will be exposed, and also to reduce managers' ability to engage in self-
dealing. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate 
Finance, and Takeovers , AM . EcoN . R EV., May 1986, at 323 . On the other hand, 
because excessive debt may cause managers to take too many risks, and introduces the 
threat of bankruptcy , firms also tend to include a significant amount of equity in their 
capital structures . See , e. g. , Michael C . Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory ofthe 
Finn: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J . FIN . ECON. 305 
(1976) . 
71. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing 
and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); Saul Levmore, Monitors and 
Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Seuings , 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982) (correcting 
Jackson and Kronman 's counterintu itive ass umption that unsecured creditors are the best 
monitors); Scott, A Relational Theory , sup ra note 61. Other important , nonmonitoring 
efforts to explain secured fmancing include Frank Buckley 's contention that security 
reduces screening costs, Francis H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle , 72 VA. L. 
R EV. 1393 (1986), and James White 's hypothesis that security addresses problems o f 
differential risk aversion. James J. White, Efficiency Justifications f or Personal Property 
Security , 37 VAND . L. R EV. 473 (1 984). See also Clifford W. Smith , Jr. & Jerold B. 
Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. EcoN. 117 
(1979) ; James H. Scott, Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure, 32 J. 
FIN. 1 (1977). Alan Schwartz has authored several impo rtant articles pointing out the 
limitations o f the various theo ries . Alan Schwartz, Th e Continuing Puzzle of Secured 
Debt , 37 VAND. L. R EV. !051 (1984); Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy 
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by their failure to explore the precise nature and full range of monitoring 
efforts. 72 
By developing a simple typoiogy of monitoring, one which draws 
from Adler's insights as well as those of other scholars, we can greatly 
enhance the explanatory power of current theories. Creditors monitor in 
either or both of·two ways: First, they investigate the debtor before 
extending credit; second, some continue to monitor even after the loan 
documents are signed. 73 Creditors that engage in both preloan and 
midstream monitoring can be described as active monitors. Those that 
only investigate initially (and simply watch for payment defaults 
thereafter) are passive monitors. 74 
Active monitoring-which may consist of policing assets, maintaining 
frequent contact, and even participating in the debtor's decision making 
processes-generally is far more expensive than passive monitoring. One 
would therefore expect to see more active monitoring in contexts where 
the debtor's conflicts of interest are particularly high: when the firm has 
a high debt/equity ratio, for instance, or when there is significant 
variability in the risk of the debtor's investment opportunities. 75 The 
existence of one or more active monitors does not mean that other 
creditors do not monitor at all; rather, they may monitor passively. 76 
Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981). Schwartz recently 
has argued that Article 9's current treatment of secured credit should be largely abolished 
and replaced with a more true first-in-time regime. Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan 
Priorities, 18 1. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1989). 
72. See BARRY E. ADLER, A NEW PERSPECfiVE ON THE BANKRUPTCY PRIORITY 
PuzzLE, (Emory University Law and Economics Working Paper No. 31, 1991) 
[hereinafter Adler, A New Perspective]. 
73. Adler points out the distinction in a new article, focusing in particular on the 
importance to dispersed equity holders of the pre-loan investigation done by unsecured 
creditors. Adler makes the important point that unfavorable changes in the terms insisted 
upon by unsecured creditors will act as a signal to shareholders, warning them of potential 
problems. !d. at 22-23. 
74 . The terms "active" and "passive" are taken from Levmore. Levmore, supra 
note 71, at 74-75. 
75. See, e.g. , Francis H. Buckley, The Termination Decision, at 21-24 (1992) 
(unpublished manuscript) . Buckley argues that termination, whether it be through 
foreclosure, bankruptcy, or some other means, should occur when equity's adverse 
incentives exceed those of creditors, and that the optimal termination point is affected by 
factors such as the debUequity ratio and variability of risk . 
76. Thus, suppliers of a close corporation will frequently consult the Dun & 
Bradstreet report on a particular firm prior to extending credit and, if problems develop, 
during the course of the parties' relationship. Similarly , the bond trustee representing 
widely scattered bondholders of a publicly held firm will review the finn's public filings 
for evidence of trouble. The use of Dun & Bradstreet and the appointment of a bond 
trustee can be seen as mechanisms for overcoming the co llective action problems of 
dispersed creditors. 
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Secured credit can be seen as a mecha.I1ism for minimizing the 
expense of active monitoring. 77 First, the bonding aspects of secured 
credit-debtors' agreement to give a priority interest and to furnish 
ongoing documentation concerning the collateral-both deter misbehavior 
in the first instance a11d streamline the monitoring process .78 Security 
also eliminates duplication of effort and the flipside problem of 
undermonitoring. 79 Secured credit achieves this efficiency by paying the 
best monitor, through its promise of priority, to do the active 
monitoring; 00 other creditors may then take advantage of the fruits of the 
secured creditor's efforts. 81 
This analysis helps explain the frequent absence of secured credit in 
publicly held corporations. Active monitoring may be unnecessary if the 
firm's debt/equity ratio is sufficiently low. 82 Moreover, the frequent 
issuance and rollover of debt has a readily observable signalling effect 
77. Scott has given the most extensive account of active monitoring in connection 
with his relational theory of secured financing. Scott, A Relational Theory, supra note 
61, at 946-50. 
78 . Rather than visiting the debtor's business on a monthly basis, a bank may be 
able to review monthly leases or accounts receivable forwarded by the debtor, as well as 
changes in the debtor's bank account. Banks' ability to insist that the debtor maintain an 
account with them is one reason they are Likely to be such good monitors. The bank 
account is relatively easy to monitor and also serves as a bonding device, because it gives 
the bank a source of setoff in the event the debtor fails to repay. 
79. Levmore, supra note 71, at 55-57. It is interesting to note that secured 
lending in the publicly held firm context is often done by a syndicate of banks, rather than 
by a single bank . The presence of multiple banks enables each to limit its exposure, and 
does not create insuperable collective action problems because the group ordinarily is 
small enough to permit coordination of efforts. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECITVE ACTJON: PuBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (2d ed. 1971); 
RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTfVE ACTION (1982). 
80 . One difficulty with monitoring explanations of secured credit is that, because 
it reduces a creditor's risk, security seems to decrease the incentive to monitor. See 
Buckley, Th e Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, supra note 71, at 1440. However, secured 
creditors still have substantial (even if not perfect) incentives to monitor if their collateral 
does not significantly exceed the amount of the loan. In addition, many secured creditors 
have an interest not only in the present Joan, but also in the possibility of future 
transactions if the debtor is successful. See infra notes 84, 85. 
81. One question that arises is, how do unsecured creditors benefit from secured 
creditor monitoring? Most importantly, other creditors benefit from the pressure secured 
creditor monitoring puts on a debtor to fully perform , rather than to shirk o r othe rwise 
fail to max.1mize the value o f the corporation. 
82 . By contrast, we might expect to see an increase in secured credit with firm s 
with investment opportunities whose risks are particularly variable o r suddenly change for 
the worse. Note, however, that there also are other reasons for securing, such as secured 
creditors' superior treatment in bankruptcy (includi.11g the possib ility of receivi ng pendency 
interest under Bankruptcy Code§ 506(b)). 
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that further reduces the need for additional monitoring. 83 By contrast, 
closely held firms almost always have significant debt and a relatively 
small equity interest, thus necessitating a particularly active monitor. 84 
Armed with the stranglehold of Article 9's priority rules, the debtor's 
secured creditor fills this role. 85 
b. The cost of the contingent/chameleon 
The problem with contingent/chameleon equity in this context is that 
it would impair a secured creditor's ability to actively monitor closely 
held debtors in the fashion described above. Because default has such 
draconian consequences in a contingent/chameleon equity regime, and 
because they are unlikely to find alternative financing if they encounter 
even temporary financial problems, closely held debtors would be even 
more concerned with narrowing the scope of default terms, or including 
cure provisions, than the publicly held debtors discussed earlier. 86 Yet 
loss of the leverage afforded by the current panoply of default terms 
would significantly limit a secured creditor's ability to actively monitor, 
particularly with respect to intangible problems such as shirking or 
underperformance. Moreover, Adler proposes to abolish the foreclosure 
rights of secured creditors, another important source of leverage over the 
debtor. 87 
83. See Adler, A New Perspective, supra note 72, at 20-21. 
84. This account suggests that secured creditors may often play different roles in 
publicly held, as opposed to closely held corporations. Even a risky publicly held 
corporation is likely to have a significant equity interest, thus diminishing (at least 
marginally) a secured creditor's risks. As a result, the secured creditors of a publicly held 
finn seem less likely to engage in some forms of particularly active monitoring, such as 
involvement in the debtor's decision-making process. 
85. Scott argues that the relationship between a secured creditor and the debtor 
in many close corporations becomes so close as to make them almost like joint venturers. 
In return for the situational monopoly Article 9 gives it, the secured creditor may provide 
business expertise that many debtors could not otherwise afford, as well as an ongoing 
source of funding. ScoU, A Relational Theory, supra note 61. 
86. The familiar "insecurity" clause, which permits a secured creditor to declare 
a default if it loses confidence in a debtor's ability to repay, see U.C.C. § 1-208 (1977) 
(imposing a good faith limitation on exercise of insecurity clauses), is one example of a 
default provision that would become problematic in a contingent/chameleon equity regime. 
87. Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32, at 332. Bradley and 
Rosenzweig propose that creditors retain their individual default rights. Bradley & 
Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1085 n.98. However, as Adler poinL~ out, retention by 
creditors of their default rights would completely undermine the contingent/chameleon 
equity regime, and thus seems incompatible with the proposal, since it would reintroduce 
the problem of races to the courthouse by creditors (and possible dismemberment of the 
firm). Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32, at 332-33. 
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In effect, contingent/chameleon equity shifts auL1ority to a firm's 
unsecured creditors, because they, rather than the secured creditor, will 
decide the firm's fate in the first instance in the event of a default. 
Unsecured creditors' newfound authority would force them to take a much 
more active role in the monitoring process. Rather than relying primarily 
on the secured bank, unsecured creditors would be required to negotiate 
with the debtor over the terms of her continued employment, to find new 
managers, or to move forward with liquidation. The prospect of this 
responsibility would require more active involvement throughout the life 
of the loan. 88 
Contingent/chameleon equity thus substitutes a regime with many 
active monitors for one with a single active monitor and numerous passive 
ones. 89 Moreover, many of these monitors-trade creditors in 
particular-are particularly unlikely to shoulder this responsibility 
effectively.>() By undermining the role of secured credit, and reinjecting 
unsecured creditors into the process, contingent/chameleon equity would 
significantly increase the overall cost of credit in closely held firms. 
In theory, the parties could simply agree among themselves to vest 
decision-making authority in the secured creditor if they wished. 
Moreover, if a closely held firm is truly in financial trouble, the secured 
creditor could end up in control even in the absence of such an 
agreement, since unsecured creditors (as the new shareholders) may not 
find it in their interest to cure all of the firm's defaults. Rather than 
vindicating contingent/chameleon equity, however, these arguments 
reinforce the earlier conclusion that the proposal is particularly unsuited 
for closely held firms. If broader secured creditor control is desirable, 
a better solution would achieve this objective directly. 
88. In the alternative, unsecured creditors might simply fail to monitor, or 
monitor very little, because (due to its abolition of individual default rights) 
contingent/chameleon equity does not permit any individual creditor to reap the rewards 
of its monitoring. Rather, monitoring becomes a collective good that must be shared with 
the entire class. Stated differently, contingent/chameleon equity reintroduces , and 
arguably exacerbates, the very collective action and duplication of effort problems that 
secured credit currently helps to solve. See Lev more, supra note 71, at 55-57. 
89 . Or, as suggested in the previous footnote, it might create a regime that lacks 
any sufficiently active monito r, if no unsecured creditor ass umes the monitoring 
responsibility . 
90. See Schwa rtz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities, supra note 71, at 
11 n.28; Levmore, supra note 71, at 53. 
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D. A World with No Bankruptcy 
Eliminating bankruptcy and relegating the parties to the state law 
collection regime, as Bowers suggests, holds promise in cases involving 
a debtor and a secured creditor that is likely to be undersecured in the 
event of a default. In these cases, bankruptcy often simply postpones an 
inevitable liquidation and, in doing so, generates significant deadweight 
costs. Because the secured creditor has an incentive to liquidate only if 
long term prospects are bleak, its decision arguably should be respected 
in the first instance. 
Bowers does not limit his critique of Chapter 11 to this context, 
however. His view of the debtor as the best liquidator argues for 
abolition of bankruptcy in a much broader array of cases. The first 
problem with his proposal is that its predictions conflict with observed 
reality . Bowers posits that debtors will use security as a means of 
insuring optimal liquidation in the event of loss. They may grant security 
in key assets-that is, assets essential to a debtor's business-to creditors 
likely to be among the last to liquidate and leave less critical, more easily 
liquidated assets (such as accounts receivable) to aggressive creditors .91 
In practice, however, debtors who use secured credit frequently give 
blanket security interests to their financing lender. 92 One rarely observes 
the subtle apportioning of security interests that Bowers's analysis has in 
mind. 
More importantly, the proposal would lead to the dismemberment of 
many corporations that are more valuable as going concerns. Medium-
sized and large firms would be particularly vulnerable in this respect. 
Given their fixed upside return, many creditors would have little incentive 
to wait patiently as the debtor sought either to renegotiate or to arrange 
a sale of the firm. State law grace periods and other stalling techniques, 
which might afford adequate time for firms that need only negotiate with 
or cure defaults with respect to one or two key creditors , would not give 
the managers of firms with more numerous and diverse creditors adequate 
breathing space to forestall a piecemeal liquidation. 93 
91. Bowers, Loss Distribution, supra note 21, at 66-67. 
92 . Article 9 a ffinnatively promotes the use o f blanket security inte rests by not 
only enab ling a secured creditor to take a security interest in all of a debtor's present and 
after acquired assets , but also giving future advances the same priority as the original loan 
(with some exceptions) if the loan includes a future advances clause. U. C. C . §§ 9-204, 
9-31 2(5) (1977). 
93. The use of a "prepackaged bankruptcy " approach-that is , negotiating a 
ccnft rmable plan prior to ftling for bankruptcy- appea rs to suffe r from c losely ana logou s 
limitations. Beca use of the barga ining obstacles, the approach is most effective if one, 
rather than multiple, class of cred itors ' interests are primarily at stake . 
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History suggests an additional problem, one which also would be 
particularly acute outside of the context of closely held firms. Prior to 
the enactment of section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act in 1934, the fate of 
financially distressed firms was played out almost exclusively in state 
foreclosure and receivership proceedings and their federal counterparts. 94 
In ot.l-:ler words, businesses once operated in a regime strikingly similar to 
the one currently proposed. 95 The widespread perception that this 
system facilitated collusion sparked the decision to undertake a vast 
reformation of the nation's insolvency laws. Critics of the equity 
receivership process were particularly concerned that management and 
senior creditors conspired to squeeze out bondholders and other widely 
dispersed investors. 96 
While investors are probably less vulnerable now than they were in 
the early decades of the century, one suspects that strategic behavior 
might once again become a more pressing problem in the absence of 
bankruptcy. This threat, together with the risk of undesirable and · 
unnecessary dismemberment, makes elimination of bankruptcy a 
particularly unattractive alternative for all but a limited class of closely 
held firms. 
E. Summary 
Each of the new propos<Ys to replace Chapter 11 is problematic in 
important respects. Both the auction proposals and contingent/chameleon 
equity hold promise only for publicly held corporations. Even in that 
context, mandatory auctions would suffer from a lack of bidders; and 
contingent/chameleon equity assumes the existence of smoothly 
functioning markets for the equity of an insolvent debtor, and would give 
rise to significant strategic behavior problems even if the assumption held 
true. In contrast to auctions and contingent/chameleon equity, eliminating 
It might be argued that the parties themselves could negotiate around the problem 
by agreeing in advance not to exercise their foreclosure rights on default. Even if such 
a solution were possible (which is questionable under current law, since the original 
creditors could not bind subsequent creditors to the scheme), it would defeat the whole 
point of Bowers's approach, which emphasizes the value of individual collection. 
94. See 8 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND 
INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACriYITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCfiONS OF PROTECfiVE 
AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES 5-9 (1940) [hereinafter SEC REPORT]. 
95. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was in place during this time, and provided a 
federal bankruptcy law, but it was not geared for the reorganization of corporations with 
publicly held securities and was rarely used in that context. ld. at 62-81. 
96. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, 
AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 35 (2d ed . 1990); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 
U.S. 482 (1913). 
494 WISCONS IN LAW REVIEW 
bankruptcy makes no sense for a publicly held co rporation, although it 
does seem attractive for some closely held firms. 97 
Given the limited range of firms for which each might prove at least 
marginall y effect ive, it is tempting to mix and match the proposals : to 
propose contingent/chamel eon equity for publicly held corporations, for 
instance , and the elimination of Chapter 11 in the context of closely held 
firms. Anoth er possibility would be to permit each firm to decid e for 
itself, that is, to include the proposals in a menu of bankruptcy options 
for firms to choose from in connection with their initial incorporation.98 
Each of these possibilities would be far from perfect, yet they raise an 
important practical question. Assuming that commentators developed an 
alternative that cl early was superior to Chapter 11 , would Congress 
recognize this and actually adopt it? I address thi s question in u'le 
following part and in doing so, shed additional light on the proposed 
alternatives to Chapter 11. 
Ill . THE POLITICS OF BANKRUPTCY 
In this part, I move from a normative analysis of each of the 
proposals to the more practical question posed at the conclusion of the 
previous part: Is it plausible to assume that Congress would adopt any 
proposal that jettisoned Chapter 11? Based on an analysis drawn from the 
public choice literature, Barry Adler contends that it is not, concluding 
instead that interest group pressures would and will thwart any effort to 
adopt even a more efficient insolvency process. 99 I argue that he 
ultimately is right, at least with respect to the current proposals, but for 
the wrong reasons. I begin by critiquing his public choice analysis. 
97. The preplanned capital structure proposal does not seem more appropriate for 
either close or publicly held corporations. While the risk of bankruptcy is likely to be 
greater in the close corporation context , sophisticated capital structure adjustments seem 
more likely to be useful for publicly held corporations. Unfortunately, the negotiating 
costs and the difficulty of making midstream adjustments would probably outweigh the 
proposal's benefits in either context. 
98 . This is the approach Rasmussen would implement. Rasmussen, supra note 
29. 
99. Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32, at 341-46. 
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A. Public Choice and Bankruptcy Legislation 
1. LIMITATIONS OF TH E STANDARD INTEREST GROUP APPROACH 
In its simplest form , public choice theory posits that legislation (or 
the failure to enact legislation) 100 frequently benefits concentrated, well-
orga.11ized interest groups at the expense of more diffuse interests. 
Although the total cost of the legisl ation to a diffuse group may exceed 
its benefits to the more concentrated one, th e cost to each individual 
member of a diffuse group is small. As a result, the diffuse group 
members do not have sufficient incentives to generate effective 
opposition. 101 
Adler argues that two concentrated groups , the corporate and 
bankruptcy bars a.ild corporate managers, benefit from the current, 
inefficient version of Chapter 11. The corporate and bankruptcy bars 
have a significant sunk investment in their expertise with respect to extant 
laws, and thus can be expected to oppose any move from the status 
quo. 102 Corporate managers are likely to challenge any proposal that 
diminishes their control over a corporate debtor. Contingent/chameleon 
equity has precisely this effect: Unlike Chapter 11, which permits 
managers to stay in charge, contingent/chameleon equity would subject 
managers to a vote of confidence and likely dismissal in the event of 
default. As a result, the prospect of its adoption also would provoke 
aggressive opposition from managers. 103 
By contrast, investors such as shareholders and bondholders would 
favor an improved bankruptcy procedure, since elimination of the 
inefficiencies of Chapter 11 would increase the present value of their 
investments. 104 Unlike the corporate and bankruptcy bars and corporate 
100. See Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REv. 339, 
367 (1988) (emphasizing that public choice analysis does not focus simply on the passage 
of legislation). 
101. ld. at 343 . See also Sam Peltzman, Towards a More General Theory of 
Economic Regulation, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 211 (1976); George T. Stigler, The Theory of 
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) . 
102. Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32, at 343-44. 
103. !d. at 344-45. 
104. In addition to the direct effect on shareholders' current investments, an 
improved insolvency regime would marginally increase the value of all corporations. Cf. 
Donald E. Schwartz, In Praise of Derivarive Suits: A Commentary on the Paper of 
Professors Fischel and Bradley, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 322, 331 (1986) (arguing that 
derivative litigation is justified in large part by its general, ex ante deterrent effect). In 
theory, one would expect shareholders to be most concerned about their current 
investments, since the price of any future investments should reflect the value of an 
improved regime. In practice, they appear to be interested in improving the future 
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managers, hmvever, both of whom are weil orga.1ized and have 
concentrated interests in the status of ba..'1kmptcy Jaw, 105 investors are 
poorly organize{}, and each has only a limited stake; the interest of each 
investor arnounts only to the increased recovery she could expect under 
a more efficient insolvency regime, multiplied by the (relatively small) 
probability that insolvency will in fact occur. 106 According to Adler, 
well-organized bankruptcy lawyers and corporate managers will 
outcompete diffuse investors for the ears of their legislators and would 
stymie any effort to adopt a superior law. 107 
Even on its own terms, the story is problematic in several respects. 
First, at least in the context of publicly held firms, investors are not 
nearly so diffuse and disorganized as Adler represents. Institutional 
investors have in recent years accumulated significant percentages of the 
stock (as well as debt instruments) of America's publicly held 
corporations. 108 In the corporate law context, such investors have taken 
an active role in opposing antitakeover provisions and other measures that 
they see as inconsistent with their interests. 109 While it is unclear 
whether institutional investors would have sufficient incentives to make 
a similar stand with respect to bankruptcy reform, the potential benefits 
playing field as well. 
105. Unlike investors, managers and corporate and bankruptcy attorneys are 
limited in their ability to diversify their interests to reduce their risks. Managers in 
particular may have a large proportion of their tangible and intangible assets invested in 
the firm they manage. Lawyers can diversify more easily: Should bankruptcy law change 
dramatically or disappear, they could develop a nascent expertise in litigation or tax law; 
but they also are at risk, especially in a difficult economic climate. It is in this sense, 
together with the fact that both groups are relatively discrete, that managers' and 
corporate and bankruptcy lawyers' interests are particularly concentrated. 
106. As suggested in the preceding footnote, investors such as shareholders and 
bondholders also are much better able to diversify their investments and thus to 
significantly reduce their risk. 
107. Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32, at 343-46. 
108. See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional 
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 447-50 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity 
Versus Control: 1JJe Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 
1277 (1991); Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional 
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811 (1992) [hereinafter Black, Agents Watching 
Agents]; BernardS. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 
(1990) [hereinafter Black, Shareholder Passivity]. 
109. Everyone agrees that institutional shareholders have begun to play a much 
more important role in corporate governance in recent years. Where the commentators 
join issue is in their predictions as to how much this activism will actually improve the 
management of publicly held corporations. Compare Rock, supra note 108 (pessimistic 
view of institutional shareholder involvement) with Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra 
note 108 (optimistic assessment of institutional shareholders' current and future role) and 
Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 108 (same). 
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of an improved regime ar1d th.e relatively low cost of regis tering their 
support suggest that managers and the bar may face greater opposition 
from these investors than Adler envisions.l1° 
Another interest group whose presence is omitted from the story is 
ba.ILI<.s and other financial institutions. Banks are notoriously well 
organized and effective as lobbyists . Among other credits, they are 
widely seen as ·having heavily influenced ti.e rules governing secured 
transactions in Article 9 of the UCC. While banks are relatively satisfied 
with their treatment in Chapter 11, they frequently complain about the 
expense and delay of the bankruptcy process. One suspects that banks 
would aggressively support legislation that addressed these problems with 
Chapter 11. Along with institutional investors, they could provide a 
powerful counterbalance to managers and the corporate and bankruptcy 
bars. 111 
A much more important problem with the standard public choice 
opposition between concentrated and diffuse groups is its failure to 
acknowledge a crucial piece in the bankruptcy legislation puzzle: the role 
of populist ideology. In the article that inspired the title of Adler's piece, 
Mark Roe suggests that "[t]he implicit public choice assumption that 
ideology doesn't count, or doesn't count much, is usually correct. But 
when the broad mass of average people have even a weak preference and 
110. In the final version of his article, Adler acknowledges the lobbying power of 
institutional investors (and banks, which are discussed in the following paragraph). 
However, he concludes that, because most firms do not become insolvent, the cost of 
bankruptcy to these investors is too small to warrant significant reform activity on their 
part. Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32, at 342. Yet it is not 
entirely clear that this is true. Rock has pointed out that institutional shareholder activism 
is most pronounced with respect to issues whose value increasing or decreasing effect is 
clear, and which can be generalized across a wide range of firms (as opposed to being 
finn specific and thus requiring a nontransferable investment by the shareholders). Rock, 
supra note 108, at 485. Shareholder opposition, in the form of shareholder resolut ions, 
to managers' use of takeover defenses is the most visible example of institutional 
shareholder activism with respect to such an issue. Jd. at 481-84 (chronicling the 
increasing success of these resolutions in recent years). Bankruptcy reform a rguab ly is 
also an example of such an issue, since it would benefit all of the ftrms in which 
institutional investors have an interest 
111. It is also interesting to note that although Adler is probably right that 
managers wo uld resist reform, he may have overestimated lawyers ' incentives to behave 
similarly. Corporate and bankruptcy lawyers have already made a substantial investment 
in mastering the current laws, as he suggests, but lawyers as a whole have a strong 
interest in promoting change. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law , 65 TEX . L. REV. 469, 
504-05 (1 987) . The uncertainty created by a new inso lvency regime would generate 
substantial new fees both because of its litigation-enhanc ing effect and because clients 
would look to attorneys for advice as to the likely impact of the system. None of the 
proposa ls wo uld so simplify all aspects o f the process as to eliminate these considerations. 
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that preference is the sarne for most people, Ll.en ideology does 
matter." 112 In Roe's vie·..v, politicians will respond to a perspective that 
is sufficiently widely held, even if the individuals are unorganized and 
widely scattered. He argues that populist distaste for concentration of 
power in the hands of large financial institutions provided a key stimulus 
for the laws limiting banks' and other financial institutions' ability to 
acquire large blocks of stock in American corporations. 113 
The populism story is particularly applicable in the bankruptcy 
context. As with large financial institutions, Americans are inherently 
distrustful of the managers of major corporations. This traditional distrust 
has spawned populist heroes such as William Jennings Bryan, Louis 
Brandeis, and William Douglas throughout the nation's history, and has 
most recently manifested itself in the widespread outrage at the 
astronomical salaries paid to the managers even of struggling 
corporations. 114 The current hostility to managers has led both to 
shareholder referendums on management compensation and to a Securities 
and Exchange Commission proposal that corporations be required to give 
a clearer picture of management compensation in their public disclosures. 
The public is hardly more sympathetic to lawyers in general and to the 
bankruptcy bar in particular .115 In short, pervasive concern about 
managerial accountability and professionals' fees in bankruptcy is a force 
that must be reckoned with in assessing the prospects for bankruptcy 
reform. 
Moreover, the history of bankruptcy in this country offers powerful 
confirming evidence that populist ideology looms large in the legislative 
process. 116 Almost all of the key reforms implemented by the Chandler 
112. Mark J . Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. 
L. REv . 10, 31 (1991) (emphasis in original) . 
113. Jd. at 32-36. See also Arthur T. Denzau & Michael C. Munge r, Legislators 
and Interest Groups: How Unorgani;:ed Interests Get Represented, 80 AM. PoL. SCJ. REV. 
89 (1986) (arguing that voters who have policy preferences are represented even if not 
organized, because interest groups will focus their attention on legis lators whose 
constituency is indifferent as to the issue in question) . 
114. See GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION 
OF THE AMERJCAN EXECUTIVES (1991). President Bush's early 1992 trip to Japan served 
as a lightening rod fo r public anger. Both the American and the Japanese press were 
quick to point out that the Ame rican a utomobile executives who accompanied Bush made 
far more in running much less healthy companies than did their Japanese counterparts. 
115. See, e.g., Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, The Lucrative Business of 
Banhuptcy , PHILA. INQ., Oct. 21, 1991, at 1A (second article in series entitled 
"America: What Went Wrong? ") (arguing that the "winners" in the surge of bankruptcies 
caused by the heavy debt o f the 1980s a re high priced consultants and lawyers). 
116. For another context in which populism proved crucial, sec JoHN W. 
KINGDON, AG ENDAS , ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 9-13 (1984) (describing how 
populist distrust o f big government led to the deregulation of the airline and trucking 
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Act of 1938 were directed at managers and the corporate and bankruptcy 
bars, whom future Justice Douglas in particular lambasted as ruthless and 
concerned only for their own profits. 117 Chapter X required both that 
the managers of a bankrupt debtor be replaced by an independent trustee 
in every case within its purview, and that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission intervene if the debtor's liabilities exceP..ded $3 million to 
ensure the fairness of the reorganization process. 118 The infringements 
on managerial discretion ushered in by the Chandler Act could not have 
been more complete, yet they passed despite the vitriolic objections of 
managers and the bankruptcy bar, who insisted the provisions would 
hopelessly bog down the reorganization process. 119 
The legislative environment of the 1990s obvious! y differs 
significantly from that of the 1930s-populism was particularly potent in 
the midst of the Depression. Yet populism has not disappeared and, as 
discussed above, appears to have acquired particular force in the wake of 
the excesses of the past decade. In addition to considering all of the 
relevant interest groups, including the pressure applied by institutional 
investors and banks, a more complete public choice story must therefore 
also account for the widespread popular antipathy toward managers and 
attorneys. Focusing in particular on the contingent/chameleon equity 
alternative to Chapter 11, I suggest such a story in the following 
subsection. 
2. ANOTHER LOOK AT PUBLIC CHOICE: THE CASE OF 
CONTINGENT /CHAMELEON EQUITY 
Adler suggests that, even if interest group obstacles might be 
overcome in the bankruptcy context, the current status of several areas of 
nonbankruptcy law would preclude adoption of the contingent/chameleon 
industries despite the countervailing pressure of interest groups such as truckers and the 
Teamsters). 
117. See WIT..LIAM 0. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 175-80 (1940) 
(criticizing management control of the reorganization process); I SEC REPORT, supra note 
94, at 4 (~Reorganizers frequently have not been concerned, in the manner of investors, 
with economy in reorganization, as economy would interfere with their profits."). 
118. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUYTCY LAWS OF THE 
UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 244-47 (1973) [hereinafter 
1973 COMMISSION REPORT]. 
119. Robert T. Swaine, "Democratization" of Corporate Reorganizations, 38 
COLUM. L. REv. 256, 277 (1938) . Swaine also complained, among other things, that 
~[m]anagement having thus been turned out, there is to be substituted, not action 
determined by free negotiation of the sccurityholders among themselves under leadership 
chosen by them, but complete SEC domination of the reorganization process." !d. at 260. 
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equity proposal he advocates. Other reform might be possible, but not 
the regime he sees as optimal. 120 
The most important of these barriers is the Internal Revenue Code. 
The tax laws have long allowed corporations to deduct the amounts they 
pay as interest on debt, but do not permit deductions for dividends, thus 
giving firms a considerable incentive to issue debt rather than equity. 121 
A contingent/chameleon equity firm would forego traditional debt in favor 
of fixed claims convertible into stock in the event of a default. Adler 
contends that the IRS almost certainly would treat these claims as equity 
rather than debt under the tax code, and would deny the debt 
deduction. 122 Given the huge cost to corporations were they to lose this 
deduction, he concludes, contingent/chameleon equity reform would only 
be attractive if it also assured that firms would not be penalized from a 
tax perspective. 
Adler assumes that the only way to achieve this effect would be for 
legislators either to eliminate taxation at the corporate level altogether 
(either directly or by granting tax credits to investors), or to eliminate the 
interest deduction. He suggests that politicians have little incentive to 
abolish corporate level taxation, due to the leverage it gives them over 
corporate managers, 123 and that the interest deduction may be protected 
by deep-seated populist support. 124 
120. In addition to the tax issue discussed in the text below, Adler argues that the 
parties' inability to bind themselves and future creditors to a contingenUchameleon equity 
scheme precludes its adoption under current law. This impediment obviously would 
disappear if Congress explicitly authorized contingenUchameleon equity. For a discussion 
of another of the impediments, the treatment of tort claimants, see infra note 127. 
121. 26 U .S.C. § 163(a) (1988); see also WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JoHN C . COFFEE, 
JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 317-18 (4th ed. 1990) (noting that current 
tax laws give fmns an almost irresistible incentive to leverage) . 
122. Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32, at 334-35 (noting that 
26 U.S.C. § 385(b)(1) defmes debt to require an unconditional promise to pay). 
123 . I d. at 345 (following Doemberg and McChesney). Fred McChesney contends 
that legislators sometimes threaten to withdraw benefits from an interest group so as to 
force the group to "pay" the legislators for a continuation of the status quo. Fred S. 
McChesney, Rent Extraction and Interest-Group Organization in a Coasean Model of 
Regulation, 20J. LEGALSTUD. 73 (1991). McChesney and Richard Doe mbergsuggest 
that corporate taxes are particularly amenable to legislator rent-seeking of this so rt. 
Richard L. Doemberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing 
Durability of Tax Refonn, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913 (1987). 
124 . Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32, at 346. Drawing 
from a recent article by Daniel Shaviro , see Daniel Shaviro , Beyond Public Choice and 
Public lnteresr: A Srudy of rhe Legislarive Process as Jllustrared by Tax Leg is/arion in rhe 
1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REv . 1, 60-61 (1990), Adler argues that American voters a rc 
willing to deny deductibility to dividends but grant it to interest on debt because they 
assoc iate dividends with the wealthy, whereas interest expense is a cost with which they 
themselves arc familiar. 
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This analysis is problematic in two related respects. First, it is not 
at all clear that contingent/cha.rneleon equity would in fact be denied debt 
status. In giving the Treasury authority to define precisely when a 
security is or is not debt under § 385 of the Internal Revenue Code, 
Congress suggested that the Treasury take several factors into 
consideration, including 1) the existence of a written, unconditional 
promise to pay on a reasonable certain date, at a fixed rate of interest; 2) 
whether the security is subordinated or preferred; 3) the ratio of debt to 
equity; 4) convertibility; and 5) the relationship between investors' 
holdings of stock and of the securities in question. As the catalogue 
suggests, no single factor is dispositive in determining whether a given 
security constitutes debt. 125 In this environment, contingent/chameleon 
equity seems very likely to qualify for the interest deduction, especially 
given the facts that conversion occurs only on default and that the 
securities are not designed for tax avoidance purposes. 1u; Second, even 
if the securities failed to qualify as debt, a much simpler proposition than 
eliminating corporate level taxation or the interest deduction would be for 
Congress to amend the tax code's definition of debt to explicitly include 
fixed claims against a contingent/chameleon equity firm. 127 
To appreciate why legislators might adopt such a measure, consider 
the following story. Assume that institutional shareholders and 
debtholders press Congress to consider replacing bankruptcy with a 
contingent/chameleon equity regime, much as they have lobbied for SEC 
action and changes at corporations like Sears, Roebuck, and General 
Motors. 128 Banks also lobby aggressively in support of the proposals. 
125. BORIS I. BITTKER & lAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS§ 4 .02, at 4-11, 12 & 14 (1987) . Interestingly, 
although the Treasury issued regulations for § 385 o f the Internal Revenue Code, it 
subsequently withdrew them. Courts therefore still are left to their own devices in 
determining whether a security qualifies as debt. 
126. See, e.g. , BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 125 , § 4 .03, at 15-20. The 
leading academic commentary on this issue, although dated in so me of its deta ils , is a 
mass ive work by William T . Plumb , Jr., The Federal Income Tax Significance of 
Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal , 26 TAX L. REV. 369 (1971) . 
127. Another of the ba rriers cited by Adler re lates to the current treatment of tort 
claimants . Adler suggests that, because adoptio n of the proposal would effectively 
subordinate holders of contingenUchameleon equity to tort cla imants, since tort claimants 
currently are deemed to be unsecured creditors, shareholde rs might be hesitant to suppo rt 
c.ontingenUchameleon equity. Adler , Financial and Political Th eories, supra note 32, at 
339-40 . This problem would a lso disappear if contingent/chameleon equity w ere a fforded 
debt status. Moreover , as Adler acknowledges in th e fin a l vers ion o f his artic le, even if 
subo rdination of this sort were unavoidable , shareho lders still might not be chilled, since 
the likelihood o f massive tort liabil ity for most ftrm s is re latively small. /d. at 340. 
128 . See , e. g. , Francine Schwadel , Sears Roebuck Seules Lawsuit over Directors, 
WALL ST. J. , Oct. 28, 199 1, at A9B (agreement by Scars to make "substantial 
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equity proposal he advocates. Ot.1er reform might be possibl e, but not 
the regime he sees as optimal. 120 
The most important of these barriers is the Internal Revenue Code. 
The tax laws have long allowed corporations to deduct the amounts they 
pay as interest on debt, but do not permit deductions for dividends, thus 
giving firms a considerable incentive to issue debt rather than equity. 121 
A contingent/chameleon equity firm would forego traditional debt in favor 
of fixed claims convertible into stock in the event of a default. Adler 
contends that the IRS almost certainly would treat these claims as equity 
rather than debt under the tax code, and would deny the debt 
deduction. 122 Given the huge cost to corporations were they to lose this 
deduction, he concludes, contingent/chameleon equity reform would only 
be attractive if it also assured that firms would not be penalized from a 
tax perspective. 
Adler assumes that the only way to achieve this effect would be for 
legislators either to eliminate taxation at the corporate level altogether 
(either directly or by granting tax credits to investors), or to eliminate the 
interest deduction. He suggests that politicians have little incentive to 
abolish corporate level taxation, due to the leverage it gives them over 
corporate managers, 123 and that the interest deduction may be protected 
by deep-seated populist support. 124 
120. In addition to the tax issue discussed in the text below, Adler argues that the 
parties' inability to bind themselves and future creditors to a contingent/chameleon equity 
scheme precludes its adoption under current Jaw. This impediment obviously would 
disappear if Congress explicitly authorized contingent/chameleon equity . For a discussion 
of another of the impediments, the treatment of tort claimants, see infra note 127. 
121. 26 U .S.C . § 163(a) (1988); see also WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, 
JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 317-18 (4th ed. 1990) (noting that current 
tax laws give firms an almost irresistible incentive to leverage). 
122. Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32, at 334-35 (noting that 
26 U.S.C . § 385(b)(1) defines debt to require an unconditional promise to pay) . 
123. /d. at 345 (following Doemberg and McChesney). Fred McChesney contends 
that legislators sometimes threaten to withdraw benefits from an interest group so as to 
force the group to "pay" the legislators for a continuation of the status quo. Fred S. 
McChesney, Rent Extraclion and Interest-Group Organization in a Coasean Model of 
Regula/ion, 20 J . LEGAL STUD. 73 (1991). McChesney and Richard Doemberg suggest 
that corporate taxes a re particularly amenable to legislato r rent-seeking of thi s so rt. 
Richard L. Doemberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Acceleraling Rate and Decreasing 
Durability of Tax Refonn , 71 MINN. L. REV . 913 (1987). 
124. Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32, at 346. Drawing 
from a recent article by Daniel Shaviro, see Daniel Shaviro , Beyond Public Choice and 
Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Jlluslrated by Tax Legislation in the 
1980s , 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 60-61 (1990), Adler argues that American voters a re 
willing to deny deductibility to dividends but grant it to interest on debt because they 
associate dividends with the wealthy, whereas interest expense is a cost with which they 
themselves a re familiar. 
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This analysis is problematic in two related respects. First, it is not 
at all clear that contingent/chameleon equity would in fact be denied debt 
status. In giving the Treasury authority to define precisely when a 
security is or is not debt under § 385 of the Internal Revenue Code, 
Congress suggested that the Treasury take several factors into 
consideration, including 1) the existence of a written, unconditional 
promise to pay on a reasonable certain date, at a fixed rate of interest; 2) 
whether the security is subordinated or preferred; 3) the ratio of debt to 
equity; 4) convertibility; and 5) the relationship between investors' 
holdings of stock and of the securities in question. As the catalogue 
suggests, no single factor is dispositive in determining whether a given 
security constitutes debt. 125 In this environment, contingent/chameleon 
equity seems very likely to qualify for the interest deduction, especially 
given the facts that conversion occurs only on default and that the 
securities are not designed for tax avoidance purposes. 126 Second, even 
if the securities failed to qualify as debt, a much simpler proposition than 
eliminating corporate level taxation or the interest deduction would be for 
Congress to amend the tax code's definition of debt to explicitly include 
fixed claims against a contingent/chameleon equity firm. 127 
To appreciate why legislators might adopt such a measure, consider 
the following story. Assume that institutional shareholders and 
debtholders press Congress to consider replacing bankruptcy with a 
contingent/chameleon equity regime, much as they have lobbied for SEC 
action and changes at corporations like Sears, Roebuck, and General 
Motors. 128 Banks also lobby aggressively in support of the proposals. 
125. BORIS I. BriTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS§ 4.02, at 4-11, 12 & 14 (1987). Interestingly, 
although the Treasury issued regulations for § 385 of the Internal Revenue Code, it 
subsequently withdrew them. Courts therefore still are left to their own devices in 
determining whether a security qualifies as debt. 
126. See, e.g., BriTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 125, § 4.03, at 15-20. The 
leading academic commentary on this issue, although dated in some of its details, is a 
massive work by William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal Income Tax Significance of 
Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 369 (1971). 
127. Another of the barriers cited by Adler relates to the current treatment of tort 
claimants . Adler suggests that, because adoption of the proposal would effectively 
subordinate holders of contingenUchameleon equity to tort claimanL~, since tort claimants 
currently are deemed to be unsecured creditors, shareholders might be hesitant to support 
contingent/chameleon equity. Adler, Financial and Political Th eories, supra note 32, at 
339-40. This problem would also disappear if contingenUchamelcon equity were afforded 
debt status. Moreover, as Adler acknowledges in the final version of his article, even if 
subordination of this sort were unavoidable , shareholders still might not be chilled, since 
the likelihood of massive tort liability for most firms is relatively small. Jd. at 340. 
128. See, e.g., Francine Schwadel, Sears Roebuck Sellles Lawsuit over Directors, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1991, at A9B (agreement by Sears to make "substantial 
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Each of these interest groups insists that reform is the onl y way to ensure 
that the managers of a giant corporation are adequately penalized for 
financial failure, and to eliminate lawyers' outrageous fees m 
bankruptcy. 129 
Managers and the bankruptcy bar are well organized and have more 
at stake tl)an any other group, and they would strongly counter this 
pressure. Their familiarity with the legislators and their presence even on 
drafting committees would make them a formidable influence. Yet 
Congress could hardly afford to ignore the widespread antipathy toward 
managers and lawyers . 
One solution might be for legislators to adopt the reform, but to give 
firms the choice whether to use contingent/chameleon equity or to stay 
with the current regime, 130 and to preserve the interest deduction for 
firms that invoked the contingent/chameleon equity option. This would 
enable Congress to extract rents from each of the relevant interest groups, 
without completely alienating any one. Moreover, as Fred McChesney 
has pointed out, organization is not an unequivocal advantage. While 
effective organization vastly enhances the influence of groups such as 
managers and attorneys, it also increases the ease with which rents can be 
extracted from them. 131 From this perspective, Congress's interest in 
collecting future rents might give it a particularly strong incentive to 
destabilize the status of managers and bankruptcy attorneys as described 
above. 
This story is obviously just that, a story . It is at least plausible that 
managers and the corporate and bankruptcy bars are sufficiently powerful, 
and would be sufficiently creative in packaging their appeal to 
Congress , 132 to thwart any proposed change. What becomes clear as 
improvements" in corporate governance in settlement o f suit challenging its treatment of 
Robert Monks's dissident campaign for a seat on the board) . 
129. See , e.g. , GORDON TULLOCK , THE ECONOMICS OF SPECIA L PRIVILEGE AND 
RENT SEEKING 23 (1 989) ("[American voters] are apt to vote, if the matter is brought to 
their attention, in terms of ideology . It is important that the measure be packaged in such 
a way that it appears to them to be somehow in acco rd with their ideo logy."). 
130. Notice that many state anti takeover provisions adopt an analogo us "opt in " 
or "opt out" approach . See 15 PA . CONS. STAT. § 2571 (1990). If contingent/chameleon 
equity actually improved on Chapter 11, market forces might pressure firms to use it , j ust 
as similar pressures caused many corpo rations to opt out of the Pennsylvania anti takeover 
provision. See, e.g. , Barbara Demick , Study Links Loss by Pennsylvania Stocks to the 
Takeover Law, PHILA . lNQ., Oct. 12 , 1990, at 1 D (more than 80 firm s opted out o f some 
o r all o f the protections). As the fo llowing section makes clea r , however, such a scenario 
would be unlikely with contingent/chameleon equity , given the prob lems with the 
proposal. 
13 1. McChesney , supra note 123, at 88 . 
!32. For instance, management might raise a rguments o f the so rt d iscussed in the 
following section, in an effo rt to fend o ff re form . Such a rguments would probably prove 
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t~e public choict- analysis is fleshed out , however , is that thi s assertion is 
at best a debatable one. If none of the proposal s is politically viable , it 
may therefore be for very different reasons. 
B. The Myth of a Self-Regulating Insolvency Procedure 
In his recent article on the Delaware Supreme Court's watershed 
corporate law decision in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Tzme 
Inc., 133 Jeffrey Gordon concludes that a "socio-h is tori cal" account better 
explains the court's actions than either the standard or a more 
sophisticated version of public choice analysis. 134 In this section, I use 
a variant of this analysis to demonstrate what ultimately is the fatal flaw 
with the proposed alternatives to Chapter 11, and why none is likely to 
be enacted. 
Gordon derives his socio-historical thesis from The Great 
Transformation, 135 Karl Polanyi's historically-based analysis of the 
relationship between market economies and government intervention. 136 
Polanyi contends that a market economy cannot exist apart from 
regulation. Regulation is necessary both to establish the market and, 
more importantly for present purposes, to prevent it from spiralling out 
of control, from causing catastrophic dislocations in society, as it would 
were it permitted to become truly self-regulating. 137 Gordon argues that 
the corporate takeover market of the 1980s began to assume many of the 
characteristics of a self-regulating market. The magnitude and abruptness 
of the changes in corporate control created a widespread perception that 
the market had lost its moorings and had begun to reward the pursuit of 
individual gain at the expense of less easily quantifiable societal values 
powerful, yet the ir effectiveness stems not so much from managerial skill at deluding the 
public, cf TuLLOCK, supra note 129, at 23; Shaviro, supra note 124, at 57-64 (describing 
systematic cognitive misperccptions by taxpayers), as from critical shortcomings in the 
proposal itself. 
133 . 571 A .2d 1140 (Del. 1989) . 
134. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets , and Courts, 91 COLUM . L. REV. 
1931 (1991) . 
135 . POLA.NYI, supra note 9. 
136. Polanyi focuses on the development of a market economy in connection with 
the Industrial Revolution of the 19th Century as a means of trying to expla in the events 
that led to the rise o f fascism a fter World War I and immed iately prior to World War II . 
According to Polanyi, the market economy did not develop naturally, as laissez faire 
economists have contended . Rather , it depended upon the commoditization o f land, labor 
and capital, and created an irreso lvable tension between the market and human rights. 
Polanyi argues that the resul tant deadlock facilita ted the emergence of fascism. !d. 
137. !d. at 141. 
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such as loyalty, continuity, and community. m From this perspective, 
the court's decision in Paramount, which gives the directors of a target 
corporation broad authority to reject a hostile takeover bid, can be seen 
as the kind of regulatory response the Polanyi thesis would predict. 
Interposing the human agency of the target directors was the court's way 
of restraining some of the excesses of fu'l entirely market-driven regime. 
Gordon's application of the Polanyi thesis sheds important light on 
Congress's likely response to the proposed alternatives to Chapter 11. 
Each of the alternatives would implement a market-based, self-regulating 
insolvency regime in place of the current judicially-oriented Bankruptcy 
Code. The preplanned adjustment, contingent/chameleon equity, and 
elimination of bankruptcy proposals attempt to obviate the need for court 
or other judicial involvement altogether. 139 (I will refer to these as the 
pure market proposals). The mandatory auction proposal retains a role 
for the court, which would arbitrate the parties' entitlement disputes, but 
depends upon the very same market dynamic, the corporate takeover, that 
Paramount arguably calls into question. 
Seen in this light, the proposals seem particularly precarious from a 
political perspective. Given the pervasive concern about the consequences 
of a self-regulating system of corporate law outside of bankruptcy, one 
suspects that Congress would reject any system that appears simply to 
transplant these perceived corporate law excesses, with their threat of job 
loss and business shutdown, into the bankruptcy domain. 140 The 
assumption in American bankruptcy law at least since the enactment of the 
Chandler Act in 1938 that state involvement in the person of a bankruptcy 
judge is needed to facilitate and protect the reorganization process 
strongly reinforces this suspicion. More regulation, rather than less, may 
well be the order of the day. 141 
138 . Gordon, supra note 134, at 1972. 
139. Bradley and Rosenzweig make this aspiration explicit: ~ An important feature 
of our proposal, distinct from others, is that it completely avoids judicial intervention." 
Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4 , at 1085 (emphasis in the origina l). 
140. Whether the concerns about the takeover market may be overs tated , or even 
wholly inaccurate, is a matter o f much dispute. The important po int for present pu rposes 
is that many po liticians and a broad segment of the public perceive the escalation of 
takeover activity to have been a dangerous and disruptive phenomenon. 
141. In theory , the analysis cou ld also be interpreted to predict that Congress 
perhaps will enact one of the proposals, but, were this to happen, courts or Congress itself 
would subsequently act to reign in the self-regu lating market the proposal had created. 
The most obvious way to reign in the proposa ls would be for cou rts to limit their 
operation, as fo r instance by granting shareholders ' suil~ to enjoin the actual cancellation 
of equity following an appa rent default. While this hypothetica l chain of events arguably 
fi ts the Polanyi thesis more closely than the analysis in the text, one suspects that 
Congress would simply reject the proposals in the first instance. 
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One could argue that the concerns underiying this conclusion are 
misguided and, ironically, are most unwarranted with respect to a fully 
self-regulating regime such as contingent/chameleon equity. Stockholders 
would lose their interests were a contingent/chameleon firm to default, 
and unsecured creditors become stockholders, but an otherwise viable 
finn could continue operating with a pared down financial structure, 
almost without breaking stride. By contrast, Chapter 11 is costly, time 
consuming, and contentious. Thus, the argument might conclude, 
adoption of a pure market proposal, and removal of judicial intervention, 
could prove both more efficient and less disruptive to intangible social 
values than Chapter 11. 
Unfortunately, the defense conceals a pair of related flaws, which 
erase the nonnative appeal of the proposals and further call into question 
their prospects for being enacted. First, as Polanyi pointed out with 
respect to the transition to a market economy generally, the promise of 
a truly self-regulating insolvency system is illusory .142 Consider the 
contingent/chameleon equity proposal once again. If a contingent/ 
chameleon firm defaulted, its shareholders would not simply stand idly by 
as their equity was cancelled and their shareholder status shifted upward 
within the firm. On the contrary, they would frequently embroil the firm 
in suits as to whether a default had actually occurred, for instance, or 
whether creditors had waived their rights. 143 The effect of such suits 
would be to bring the state right back into the picture. 
The other flaw is more pervasive. The pure market proposals 
assume that, since market players can be expected to make better asset-
deployment decisions than a court would, the optimal insolvency regime 
is one that removes the judicial apparatus altogether. This reasoning 
ignores the fact that, despite being poorly positioned to make most 
business decisions, 144 courts still have a crucial role to play in an 
insolvency proceeding. Courts are well equipped to detect strategic 
behavior, and the current Bankruptcy Code is replete with provisions that 
put the court in this role. Some, such as the preference provisions, 
involve relatively little judicial discretion; 145 other sections, such as 
142. POU\NYI, supra note 9, at 141. 
143. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 5, at 104-05. 
144. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 18, at 497 (arguing that courts should not make 
business decisions such as the decision whether to approve preconfmnation sales of most 
or all of a finn's assets in bankruptcy); Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and The 
American Law Jnsrirule Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN . L. REv. 927, 946 
(1983) (arguing that courts are better able to police for duty of loyalty violations than for 
violations of the duty of care). 
145. Bankruptcy Code§ 547. 
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those dealing with fraudulent conveyances 14{) and equitable 
subordination, 147 require the court to make extremely subjective 
judgments as to whether a party has acted opportunistically. 
To be sure, the parties could invoke a variety of analogous 
nonbankruptcy statutory and common law rules as a means of policing 
strategic behavior even in a pure market insolvency regime. But the 
panoply of nonbankruptcy causes of action would fall well short of 
bankruptcy in three different respects. First, nonbankruptcy rules address 
only a limited range of the strategic behavior that occurs in the insolvency 
context. Fraudulent conveyance and related nonbankruptcy laws prohibit 
a debtor from entering into sham transactions whose effect is to transfer 
assets out of the estate, for instance, but are much less effective in 
curbing a debtor's ability strategically to favor certain legitimate creditors. 
Bankruptcy's more complete response to strategic behavior could be 
replicated, of course, outside of bankruptcy. For example, courts might 
use equitable subordination principles to address preinsolvency favoritism 
and Congress or the states could adopt preference provisions tailored to 
the new pure market insolvency regime. 148 But each of these responses 
presumes and necessitates a general, insolvency-triggered reassessment of 
the parties' respective entitlements-precisely what the pure market 
theories purport not to need. 
Second, in the absence of bankruptcy, a party might bring a suit 
alleging that another creditor received a fraudulent conveyance in one 
jurisdiction, while a lender liability claim was filed in an entirely different 
forum. At the least, they will be largely disconnected cases, despite their 
common nexus in a financially troubled debtor. Consolidating these suits 
in a single court, before a single judge, offers significant judicial 
146. !d. § 548. Compare Mellon Bank, N .A . v. Metro Communications, Inc., 945 
F.2d 635 (3d Cir. 1991) (reversing finding that bank's financing of a leveraged buyout 
constituted a fraudulent conveyance) with Crowthers McCall Pattern, Inc. v. Lewis, 129 
B.R. 992 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (denying lender's motion to dismi~s fraudulent conveyance 
action). 
147 . Bankruptcy Code § 510(c) . See, e.g., Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of 
Heartland Chern., Inc. v. Banque Paribas (In re Heartland Chemicals, Inc .) , 136 B.R. 503 
(C. D. Ill. 1992) (bank's actions in pursuing prepetition remedies did not warrant equitable 
subordination) . 
148. Adler suggests that the parties could also devise contractual responses to 
eliminate the possibility of strategic behavior. Adler, Financial and Political Theories, 
supra note 32, at 330. One problem with this approach is that the parties' attempts to 
anticipate and address every potential defalcation would make the contracting process 
enormously expensive. Moreover, as the analysis in the text makes clear, private ordering 
will inevitably be an inadequate substitute for ex post judicial review in the bankruptcy 
context. See, e.g., George M. Cohen, The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract 
Law, HOFSTRA L. REV. 94 (forthcoming 1992). 
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economies. 149 Moreover, unlike ordinary state or federal judges, 
battkruptcy judges are specialists, and have particular familiarity with the 
end game maneuvers pa.rties engage in prior to bankruptcy. 1.so 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the progression of a bankruptcy 
case gives the parties an opportunity to observe and examine the debtor 
(as well as one another). To facilitate this process, the Bankruptcy Code 
and rules require the debtor to file various forms of disclosure151 and 
provide dramatically liberalized access to the debtor's officers, employees, 
and files. 152 Stated differently, the existence of a collectivized 
insolvency proceeding acts as an information forcing device which enables 
the parties to detect misbehavior that otherwise might have gone 
unnoticed, thus further reducing both the likelihood and efficacy of 
strategic behavior. The process also gives every constituency an 
opportunity to watch the firm during its transition period, and thus to 
reassess their relationship wit.lJ the debtor; and it establishes a reckoning 
point against which future performance can be measured. 153 
149. This conclusion should not be taken to imply that the parties must prosecute 
all litigation involving the debtor, of whatever nature, in the bankruptcy court. Robert 
Rasmussen has argued persuasively that bankruptcy courts should defer to the expertise 
of administrative agencies with respect to certain kinds of administrative proceedings. 
Robert K. Rasmussen, Bankruptcy and the Administrative State, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1567 
(1991). 
150. The argument in the text is analogous to commentators' frequent citation of 
the corporate law expertise of Delaware's chancery court as .one of the reasons for 
Delaware's continued success in attracting corporate charters. Macey & Miller, supra 
note 111, at 488-89 . 
151. Chapter 11 debtors are required to provide extensive, ongoing disclosure in 
accordance with standards the district in question has adopted under Bankruptcy Rule 
9029 . For other disclosure requirements, see Bankruptcy Code § 704(8) (requiring 
periodic reports in Chapter 7 cases); id. § 521 (requiring debtor to file a "schedule of 
assets and liabilities, a schedule of current income and current expenditures, and a 
statement of the debtor's financial affairs"); id. § 1125 (requiring plan proponent to file 
disclosure statement in connection with a proposed reorganization plan) . 
152. Bankruptcy Rule 2004. Rule 2004 has been interpreted to authorize 
significantly greater access to discovery than that afforded by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See, e.g., In re GHR Energy Corp., 33 B.R. 451, 453 (D. Mass. 1983) 
(examination may be "exploratory and groping"). 
153. An analogy can be drawn between Chapter 11 and the role of the appraisal 
remedy in state corporate law. The appraisal remedy has traditionally been seen as a 
means of insuring that shareholders who disapprove of a fundamental change and who do 
not wish to continue with the corporation will be bought out at a fair price. See Hideki 
Kanda & Saul Levmore, Tfle Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 
UCLA L. REV. 429, 430-31 (1985) (discussing the traditional view and the sustained 
criticism it has received). Kanda and Lcvmore have argued that the appraisal remedy may 
in reality serve somewhat different purposes . In their view, some state appraisal statutes 
perform a ~recko ning " function, and others help shareholders uncover opportunistic 
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In short, in their single-minded focus on introducing market 
efficiency into the insolvency process, the pure market proposals greatly 
underestimate the threat of prebankruptcy strategic behavior and 
bankruptcy's effectiveness as a policing mechanism. It is particularly 
ironic that, as discussed earlier, the proposals actually increase the 
likelihood of costly strategic behavior, 154 even as they undermine the 
parties' ability to detect, penalize, and therefore restrain it. 155 
Recognition of the role of the bankruptcy court and of the collective 
proceeding provided by Chapter 11 raises a final question: Must these 
functions necessarily be state-sponsored? In theory, the parties 
themselves could develop an analogous proceeding contractually .156 The 
parties might appoint an arbitrator, for instance, who would perform the 
monitoring role currently handled by a bankruptcy judge. 157 The parties 
could give the arbitrator authority to require and oversee discovery , both 
for detecting strategic behavior and to assess the prospects of the firm. 
The parties would lose the subsidy provided by a state-sponsored 
proceeding if they were to replicate its benefits contractually, but they 
would also avoid the costs of its current inefficiencies . 
Unfortunately, use of a contractual arbitration proceeding ultimately 
seems untenable for at least two reasons. The first stems from the 
difficulty of establishing an effective framework. In addition to 
appointing an arbitrator, the parties would need to provide for a means of 
representing diverse and scattered claimants-in short, to replicate in 
some fashion Chapter 11 's committee framework. Moreover, unlike a 
court, the arbitrator could not resolve either claims involving 
behavior by the firm's managers. /d. at 441-44 . Bankruptcy arguably does each of these 
things in a much less awkward (although expensive) fas hion . 
154. See supra notes 63-69, 94-96 and accompanying text. 
155. The analysis in the text suggests that, as a minimum, any alternative to 
Chapter 11 should provide for a comparab le postinsolvency co llective proceeding. See, 
e.g . , John C. Coffee, Jr. , The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay 
on the Judicia l Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1 989) (a rguing that parties should be 
permitted to bargain with respect to fiduciary duties, but not below a mandatory minimum 
standard o f good faith) . Notice that this would impose an important limitation on each 
of the choices in Rasmussen's "menu" approach. 
156. As a practical matter, the difficulty of binding both present and future parties 
creates a serious impediment to devising such a scheme. For example, U.C.C. § 9-201 
makes clear that if the debtor failed to include the arrangement in a contract with one of 
its secured creditors, such a creditor would not be bound. For the purposes of the 
discussion that foll ows, I put this problem to one side. 
157 . The dra fters of the UCC are currently co nside ring amending Article 2 to 
provide for mandatory arbitration in some contexts. See Letter from Paul Barron to 
David Skeel (July 13, 1992) (on file with author). While a rbitration is more attractive in 
a two-pa rty context than in one involving multiple parties, the proposal suffers from some 
of the de fects di scussed in the text below. 
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nonconsensua! creditors, such as tort claimants, or pension claims and 
other nonbankruptcy issues. These limitations would severely constrain 
her effectiveness. 
Even if the parties somehow surmounted their organizational 
difficulties, however, a state-sponsored system stili would be superior. 
Unlike the contractual alternative, a state-sponsored system offers benefits 
not only for the case at hand, but also for future parties. The 
development of a rich body of precedent lowers dispute and litigation 
costs significantly by reducing uncertainty as to likely outcomes. 158 To 
be sure, the arbitrator inevitably would rely on existing precedent in 
making her determinations. But if a significant percentage of firms 
decided to create their own collective proceeding by contract, the 
precedent base would quickly begin to erode. 159 As a result, other 
things being equal, a state regime will always be preferable to its 
contractual counterpart. 
C. Concluding Thoughts 
Each of the proposed alternatives to Chapter 11 picks up on the need 
for a more market-based decision-making apparatus in Chapter 11. As 
I myself have argued, the current Bankruptcy Code too often vests 
decision-making authority, even with respect to what ultimately are 
business decisions, in the hands of the bankruptcy judge. 1w A better 
regime would shift authority in these contexts away from the court and 
back toward the marketplace. As our application of the Polanyi thesis has 
suggested, however, removing the court from the role of business 
decision maker does not mean that the court can or should be eliminated 
entirely. Both the court and the existence of a state-sponsored collective 
proceeding play a crucial role in the insolvency process. Coupled with 
their other shortcomings, the insistence of the new proposals on imposing 
a self-regulating market procedure makes each an inadequate substitute for 
the current regime. 
158. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976); ROB ERT E. S COTT & DOUGLAS L. 
LESLIE, C ONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 8 (1988) . 
159. Erosion of the precedent base was one of the chief arguments aga inst adopting 
separate rules for close corporations outside of bankruptcy. See Dennis S. Karjala, A 
Second Look at Special Cwse Corporation Legislation , 58 TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1213-27 
(1980); Jan Ayres, Judging Cwse Corporations in the Age ofStaJutes , 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 
365, 373 (1992) . 
160. Skeel, supra note 18, at 497-500 (unsecured creditors rather than the court 
should approve or disapprove preconfirmation sales of substantial assets). 
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IV. WHAT CAJ"·l BE DONE WITH THE BANKRUPTCY CoDE? 
The analysis of the preceding parts has suggested at least two crucial 
lessons for ban.l<JUptcy reform. First, both the proposed alternatives to 
Chapter 11 and Chapter 11 itself fail adequately to distinguish among 
close and publicly held corporations. A superior regime must function 
effectively in each, rather than only in one or the other, of these contexts. 
Second, reform must be particularly sensitive to the appropriate domains 
of market and of judicial decision making. 
My aim in this part is to show that the drafters could better 
accomodate both of these goals if they scrapped the "one size fits all" 
approach of current Chapter 11 in favor of separate chapters for close and 
nonclosely held corporations. The move toward separate chapters with 
what I will refer to as more "context specific" rules would make it 
significantly easier to give decision making authority over business issues 
to private decision makers (i.e., the parties themselves), rather than to a 
court, while retaining judicial involvement with respect to those issues 
that courts are particularly well equipped to decide. 
The proposal to establish a two corporation system has a familiar 
ring in the insolvency context: Both Chapters X and XI of the old 
Bankruptcy Act, and bankruptcy legislation recently considered by 
Congress distinguish between closely held and public corporations. After 
explaining the potential benefits of separate chapters, I conclude the part 
by examining both the unsuccessful Act regime and the proposed 
bankruptcy legislation in light of the very different two corporation 
system I would propose. 
A. Different Rules for Different Debtors: The Need for 
Separate Closely Held and Nonclosely Held Corporation Chapters 
Corporate law commentators first called for special treatment of close 
corporations in states' corporation law statutes more than sixty years 
ago. 161 The argument was simple: Because of their unique 
characteristics, close corporations are ill served by a general statute that 
treats all corporations as essentially equivalent. States and the drafters of 
the model codes have responded by enacting special provisions addressing 
particular close corporation issues. 162 
161. See, e.g., Joseph L. Weiner, Legislative Recognition of the Close 
Corporation, 27 MICH. L. REV. 273 (1929). 
162. More than 20 states currently have special provisions of one form or another 
for close corporations. 1 F. HODG E O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON , O'N EAL 'S CLOSE 
CoRPORATIONS§ 1.15, at 76 (3d ed. 1987). 
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Although both close aild pubiicly held firms may one day file for 
bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code does not carry forward the corporation 
law policy of distinguishing between u'1em. As a result, and as 
commentators have long noted, a significant number of Bankruptcy Code 
provisions are particularly ill suited for certain kinds of debtors. A brief 
discussion of two pressing issues, one relating to close corporation 
debtors and one to publicly held firms, should begin to iliustrate the need 
for a more context-specific insolvency regime. 
First, the close corporation context. Lynn LoPucki has shown that, 
despite the Code's requirement that an unsecured creditors' committee 
comprising seven of the debtor's largest unsecured creditors be appointed 
in every case, 163 courts routinely fail to appoint such committees in 
bankruptcies involving closely held debtors. 164 This failure probably 
reflects the lack of a sufficient incentive for unsecured creditors to 
participate, since their ciaims may be relatively small and most or all of 
any distribution usually goes to the firm's secured lender. 165 The 
problem is that in those cases where recovery is or would be likely, 
unsecured creditors may lose out because they are not represented at the 
bargaining table. 
A regime that distinguished between close and publicly held 
corporations could easily address this breakdown of the committee 
structure. Rather than require a court to find seven willing committee 
members, the close corporation provision could authorize the court to 
appoint a single large unsecured creditor to act as the representative for 
the class. This creditor would have all the rights currently afforded to a 
committee, and would owe the same fiduciary duty to its constituency. 
Such a rule not only would ensure greater protection for unsecured 
creditors in cases where recovery is likely, 166 but it also would 
163. Bankruptcy Code§ 1102. 
164. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under 
Chapter 11 ofthe Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J . 247 (1983). 
165. Bowers, Murphy's Law, supra note 21, at 2098 n.2 ; DAVID T. STANLEY & 
M . GiRTH, BANKRUPTCY PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 88, 127, 130 (1971) (general 
unsecured creditors of corpo rate debtors receive an average of only 8% of their claims). 
Bowers suggests that unsecured creditors' low recoveries are due to the likelihood that 
debtors have taken significant actions to distribute their losses prior to bankruptcy-that 
is, they have so ld assets and paid various creditors. In reality, it seems more likely that 
the vast majority of closely held debtors' assets are tied up in a secu red loan even in more 
prosperous times and that financial difficulties simply exaggerate this si tuation. Stated 
differently, gene ral cred itors depend upon current payment, not payment in bankruptcy, 
and bankruptcy results do not disappoint this expectation. 
166. The question ari ses as to whether even a single c red ito r committee is 
appropriate in cases where unsecured creditors' interests are completely under water. The 
answer would appear to be affirmative fo r two reasons . First , the single creditor would 
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significantly lower the committee's costs. 
Context specific rules also might greatl y improve th.e reorganization 
of publicly held debtors. I have argued at length elsewhere that 
unsecured creditors should be given voting authority over the choice of 
a debtor's directors (in the event that ar1 election is held in Chapter 11) 
and also with respect to the decision whether to approve a proposed 
preconfirmation sale of most or all of u1e firm's assets. 167 As the new 
residual owners of an insolvent firm, unsecured creditors could be 
expected to make better directorial decisions than shareholders, who are 
the current voters. 168 Their financial stake also gives them decision-
making incentives superior to those of courts, which currently make what 
is in effect a business judgment in deciding whether to approve asset 
sales. 169 These voting proposals make sense only for Chapter 11 cases 
involving publicly held firms, but, in that context, both would markedly 
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the decision-making 
process. 170 
The problems with bankruptcy's current undifferentiated rules stem 
largely from the classic differences between close and publicly held 
corporations. Publicly held corporations are characterized by a separation 
of ownership and control, with professional managers running the 
corporation and widely scattered shareholders as its nominal owners. 171 
By contrast, closely held corporations frequently have a small number of 
shareholders, most or all of whom also participate in the management of 
the firm. The shares of a closely held firm are not traded on a public 
exchange and are frequently subject to restrictions on transfer. m 
How should the Bankruptcy Code be reformed to better reflect these 
differences? One approach would be to employ the American Law 
presumably participate less actively in a case where unsecured credito rs are not likely to 
recover anything. Second, and more importantly , if unsecured creditors' interests are 
clearly under water, a better solution would be to grant the secured creditor relief from 
the automatic stay, and to allow the secured credito r to determine how best to make use 
of the assets of the firm . 
167. Skeel, supra note 18. 
168 . !d. at 505-13 . 
169 . !d. at 495-501. 
170. Unsecured creditor voting on directors is less attractive in the context of 
closely held firms, because jeopardizing the debtor' s role as director or owner is likely 
to mean the end of the corporation in its current form. The problem with unsecured 
creditors voting on prcconf1rmation sales of assets is that unsecured creditors often are not 
the optimal decision makers with respect to a closely held Chapter 11 debtor. Because 
many closely held debtors are fully encumbered and their secured creditor 
underco Uateralized, secured creditors may frequently be the residual class in this co ntext. 
See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 18, at 497 n.134. 
171. See, e.g., ROBERT C . CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 359-60 (1986). 
172. /d. at 24-28. 
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Institute's strategy outside of bankruptcy-a strategy shared by a number 
of states-of adding "close corporation" and "publicly held corporation" 
to the definitional section of the Code, and then referencing these 
definitions in provisions that apply to a specific kind of corporate 
debtor. m Such an approach would prove unsatisfactory in the 
bankruptcy context, however. Because the provisions of Chapter 11 
comprise an elaborate corporate governance framework, many of whose 
sections function differently for different kinds of corporations, the 
cha...YJges needed are too extensive to be addressed in piecemeal fashion. 
Rather than following the ALI approach, then, the drafters should 
establish entirely separate chapters for closely held and nonclosely held 
debtors. 174 As the discussion above indicates, the close corporation 
chapter should alter the current committee structure to provide for a 
single creditor agency arrangement, whereas nonclosely held corporations 
might continue to use the extant rules for committee formation. 
Similarly, the proposals for unsecured creditor voting on directors and 
preconfirmation sales should be adopted in the nonclosely held 
corporation chapter, but not for close! y held firms. 
The drafters also could address problems with respect to two other 
important aspects of corporate reorganization in connection with the move 
to a two chapter system. Both reforms would pressure the parties to 
reorganize more quickly and, as a result, would decrease both the direct 
costs-lawyers and other professionals charge less in a twelve month case 
than in a two year case-and the indirect costs of bankruptcy. 
The first deals with the debtor's agenda control over the 
reorganization process. Under the Bankruptcy Code in its current form, 
173. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, Part I (Mar. 31, 1992) [hereinafter ALI, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE]_ The ALl defines a debtor with a smaU number of 
shareholders and for which no active trading market existed prior to bankruptcy as a 
"close corporation debtor." The existence of 500 or more shareholders and at least $5 
million in total assets meets the sl2.ndard for being publicly held. !d. § 1.31. The ALI 
definition of publicly held corporations is derived from various sources, including 
Secu rities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g) and Rule 12g-1 , and Federal Securities Code § 
402a. The ALI also has specific definitions for "Large Publicly Held Corporation," ALI, 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra, § 1.24, and "Small Publicly Held 
Corporation." !d. § 1 _35 _ 
174_ The distinction between close and publicly held corporations leaves o ut a 
la rge class of finn s that fall between these two extremes. Because closely held firm s 
differ far more from either publicly held corporations or this intermediate class of firm s 
than the other two types of firms differ from one another, closely held finns sho uld have 
an entirely sepa rate chapter. The other chapter would comprise all corpo rations that do 
not fit this definition and thus are "nonclosely" held. A more precise breakdown might 
make furthe r distinctions among nonclosely held firm s (as the ALI does), b ut the benefits 
of the added precision do not seem significant enough to warrant such a step. 
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the debtor in possession alone has the right to propose a reorganization 
plan for the first 120 days of a bankruptcy case. 175 This initial 
exclusivity period is not itself a problem-the rule focuses tl-)e parties' 
efforts and vests authority in the only party that is fully familiar with all 
aspects of the firm. 176 But courts routineiy extend exclusivity, 
particularly in cases involving publicly held firms. 177 Unfortunately, 
these extensions give the debtor an indefinite stranglehold over the plan 
process in many cases, and exacerbate the incentives a debtor already has 
to slow the reorganization process.m The problem could be 
substa..r1tially reduced if the drafters were to impose a fixed limit on the 
length of the debtor's exclusivity period. Increasing the exclusivity period 
to 180 days, but prohibiting extensions, for instance, would afford a 
nonclosely held debtor sufficient breathing space and at the same time 
increase the pressure to develop a plan quickly. Because the negotiations 
involving closely held firms are frequently less complex, the drafters 
could adopt a shorter, but equally fixed, exclusivity period such as ninety 
days for closely held firms. 179 
Given courts' frequent effectiveness in policing opportunistic 
behavior, one might wonder why the drafters need to propose a legislative 
solution to the exclusivity issue; that is, why do courts themselves not 
impose appropriate limits? The problem apparently is that courts are 
largely unable to credibly commit to terminating exclusivity at the end of 
175. Bankruptcy Code § 1121. 
176. Bradley Johnston has pointed out another advantage of exclusivity: It ensures 
the existence, at least initially, of a "single negotiating text.~ J. Bradley Johnston, The 
Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213, 270 (1991). Starting with a single plan 
rather than several conflicting proposals simplifies and coordinates the bargaining process. 
HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 211 (1982) (single 
negotiating text used in the negotiations between Begin and Sad at to focus the parties' 
attention on a single document). 
177. LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share, supra note 10, at 28. 
178. Note that these incentives arc particularly problematic when the managers are 
aligned with shareholders, since they will want to prolong the case and take risks so as 
to increase the likelihood shareholders will end up with something. See, e.g., Jackson & 
Scott, supra note 19, at 170. 
179. After this article was written, the House passed bankruptcy legislation that 
would have limited exclusivity to one year (and also deleted a proposed new chapter that 
included a ninety day limitation for close corporations). H.R. 6020, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 
§ 102 (1992). While I prefer a 180 day limitation (and also have some reservations about 
the proposal's escape hatch, which would have permitted extensions if "the need for such 
an increase is attributable to circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held 
accountable"), the one year limit would have improved upon current law had the 
legislation not eventually died. I discuss the legislation in more detail, infra Section IV. 8. 
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the current 120--day period. 180 Tne debtor, as weli as the other parties, 
knows that the court will extend exclusivity if the parties have made 
progress toward a confirmable reorganization plan; the debtor therefore 
has little incentive to hasten the reorganization process. While a 
bankruptcy judge could announce at the beginning of a case ti1at she does 
not intend to extend exclusivity, the debtor has little reason to believe that 
she will not change her mind if, at the end of the initial period, the parties 
appear to need just a week or two more to conclude their 
negotiations. 181 Legislative commitment to a fixed exclusivity period 
eliminates these problems by making a court's threat fully credible. 
Second, the drafters could adjust the confirmation requirements of 
the nonclosely held corporation chapter to curb the hold up power 
currently wielded in that context by the shareholders of a Chapter 11 
debtor. Under the current Bankruptcy Code, the parties have a strong 
incentive to pass a consensual reorganization plan, despite the facts that 
consensual reorganization requires voting approval of every class of 
claims or interests and, further, that the Code provides for confirmation 
of a nonconsensual, "crarndown" plan. 182 Consequently, even though 
shareholders theoretically have little or no financial interest in an 
insolvent firm, the plan proponent must secure their approval in order to 
confirm a consensual plan. Shareholders frequently use the veto power 
that the process gives them to delay the case. 183 To address this 
180. The problem is exacerbated by bankruptcy judges' desire to encourage high 
profile debtors to file for bankruptcy in their courthouse. Lynn M. LoPucki & William 
C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Ban/..:ruptcy Reorganization of 
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 WIS. L. REV 11, 13. 
181. Courts' inability to make a credible commitment or threat in this context 
stems from their lack of a direct stake in the outcome of the case. Because they lack a 
direct interest, courts cannot easily provide a "hostage" or otherwise commit themselves 
to a particular course of action. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Credible 
Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. EcoN. REV. 519 (1983). 
182. Bankruptcy Code§ 1129(a)(8) requires, for a consensual plan, that each class 
that is impaired vote in favor of the plan. The requirements for a nonconsensual plan, the 
most important of which is the absolute priority rule, are set forth in Bankruptcy Code§ 
1129(b). Due to the expense and uncertainty of the valuation required under Bankruptcy 
Code § 1129(b ), both the parties and courts are strongly predisposed toward consensual 
reorganization . LoPucki and Whitford argue that the attorneys' status as repeat players 
who will encounter one another again in future Chapter 11 cases is also a crucial element 
in this calculus. LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share, supra note 10, 
at 143-58. 
183. Strategic behavior of this sort appears to have played a key role in the 
collapse of an auction in the bankruptcy of Allegheny International. Donaldson, Lufkin 
& Jenrette Securities twice seemed to have won the auction, but the debtor reopened the 
bidding on both occasions after heavy pressure from the firm's shareholders to consider 
new offers by the other bidder, Paul Levy. The Paul Levy bids did not appear to offe r 
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problern, the drafters should amend § 1129, the confirmation provision, 
to provide in the nonclosely held firm context that, if a plan is approved 
by every class except the firm's shareholders, the court must approve the 
plan if the firm appears to be insolvent as of the time of the vote. This 
partial crarndown, a variation of LoPucki and Whitford's recent 
"preemptive cramdown" proposal, would significantly reduce the duration 
of cases in which shareholder opportunism is the primary impediment to 
timely reorganization. 1&4 While partial cramdown theoreticaliy is 
possible under the current Bankruptcy Code, adopting it explicitly would 
effectively counter the parties' current reluctance to utilize this alternative 
to consensual reorganization. 
As with unsecured creditor voting on directors and preconfirmation 
sales, partial cramdown is less attractive for closely held firms, whose 
shareholders and managers are the same people. If the corporation is 
deeply insolvent, it may make more sense for the court to grant relief 
from the automatic stay for the primary lender. 185 On the other hand, 
for those close corporation cases where reorganization is at least 
plausible, the drafters could consider adopting a variation of the new 
value exception to the absolute priority rule, which permits shareholders 
to retain an interest in the reorganized company over the objections of 
creditors, even if the creditors will not be paid in ful1. 186 While the 
exception is entirely inappropriate for nonclosely held firms (and is rarely 
used in that context), a case can be made for its inclusion in modified 
form in a chapter limited to closely held debtors. 187 
superior value; rather, their salient characteristic was that they proposed a particularly 
generous treatment of shareholders. The value of the firm fell precipitously after the 
auction co llapsed . See, e.g., Clare Ansberry, Takeover Mayhem: When Will 
Somebody-Anybody-Rescue Battered Allegheny?, WALL ST. 1., Apr. 19, 1990, at Al. 
184. LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share, supra note 10, at 186. 
LoPucki and Whitford argue that, if the debtor is so clearly insolvent that there is no 
possibility shareholders will be entitled to a distribution, courts should make a finding 
early in the case effectively excluding shareholders from the case. The problem with this 
proposal is that ea rly in the case courts will be excessively optimistic about the possibility 
of a recovery for shareholders, rather than risk being proven wrong by subsequent events. 
The advantage of the partial cramdown proposal is that it comes at a time in the case 
when the debtor's value is much more clear, and the threat of strategic behavior is 
particularly acute. 
185. See supra note 166. 
186. David A. Skeel, Jr. , The Uncertain State of an Unstated Rule: Bankruptcy's 
Contribution Rule Doctrine After Ahle rs, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J . 221, 223 (1989). 
187 . See Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations , 44 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1991). Markell argues that shareholders should 
retain their right to participate in the new value context, but only if the potentia l for abuse 
is controlled through several important changes in the reorganization process . In 
particular, in order to neutralize the shareholders' procedural adva ntage, Ma rkell 
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Needless to say, the two reorganization chapters will overlap in some 
respects. Both should retain the assumption that current managers will 
continue to operate the business in bankruptcy, for instance. 188 But 
more carefully tailoring the bankruptcy process to account for differences 
between closely held and publicly held corporations would greatly 
improve the process, and change could provide a means of addressing 
many of the problems that currently plague Chapter 11, such as 
administrative inefficiency and the frequent failure to put decision-making 
authority in the hands of the constituency most likely to wield it 
effective! y. 
B. The Failure Last Ti.me: Chapters X and XI of the 
Bankruptcy Act 
One potential objection to the proposed shift to a two corporation 
regime might suggest, in effect, that the drafters have already tried this 
strategy and it did not work. To appreciate the objection, it is necessary 
first to consider briefly the structure of the former Bankruptcy Act. 
Under the Act, the drafters developed separate chapters for publicly 
held corporations and nonpublic firms. Chapter X, the chapter for 
publicly held firms, provided for replacement of management by a 
trustee, required strict adherence to the absolute priority rule, and was 
only available to firms whose debts exceeded $3 million. 189 By 
contrast, Chapter XI permitted the firm's managers to stay in charge, 
prohibited modification of the firm's secured debt, and did not condition 
reorganization on preservation of absolute priority .1<;() 
advocates that the exclusivity period be terminated as soon as an equityholder proposes 
a new value plan, that the Bankruptcy Code should not require the proponent of a 
competing plan to prove the "reorganization value of the firm, and that a court should 
confmn the competing plan (rather than the equityholder's plan) if the parties vote in 
favor of both it and the new value plan. !d. at 112-21. Even in this modified form, the 
exception would only be attractive if courts were willing to confirm liquidating plans or 
grant relief from the stay in the event the debtor is hopelessly insolvent. See generally 
Skeel, supra note 186 (criticizing the exception as currently applied). 
188. Bankruptcy Code§ 1107. In the nonclosely held fmn context, immediate 
removal of management would create significant indirect costs both before and during 
bankruptcy. Prior to bankruptcy, managers would stall as long as possible rather than file 
a bankruptcy petition and immediately lose their jobs. During bankruptcy, immediate 
replacement of management with a trustee would add to the distractions of the process, 
since the trustee would be unable to focus on business affairs until she familiarized herself 
with the firm . With respect to close corporations , because the managers are both the 
shareholders and an integral part of the identity of the firm, ousting them would all but 
eliminate the benefits of bankruptcy for such a debtor. 
189. 1973 COM~f!SSION REPORT , sup ra note 118, at 244-48. 
190. Id. 
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The Act scheme proved a colossal failure. The managers of pub! icl y 
held firms took advantage of Chapter XI's failure to explicitly exclude 
these firms, and filed under Chapter XI so t.I1at they could retain control 
of the company and would not be hamstrung by the absolute priority rule . 
Pitched, and costly, battles arose as to whether this was a permissible 
jurisdictional choice. 191 
While the experience with Chapters X and XI illustrates some of t.I1e 
risks of a context-specific approach, it ultimately does not undermine the 
case for a two corporation system. First, and most obviously, the 
proposed reforms outlined above do not suffer from the specific flaws that 
doomed the Act regime. The proposal would preserve the current Code's 
presumption that the present managers will stay in office for both 
chapters, 192 therefore eliminating the considerable forum-shopping 
incentives created by a framework that automatically removes managers 
in one context but not another. Clearly defining which chapter applies to 
a particular debtor would further diminish the likelihood of costly 
manipulation . 
The more important problem with the Act framework, however, was 
simply that Chapter X took the drafters' concern for state involvement in 
the bankruptcy process several steps too far. With the lessons of the Act 
still relatively fresh, Congress almost certainly would avoid these mistakes 
in crafting a more context specific Code, and might redress at least the 
most obvious of the problems with an undifferentiated insolvency regime. 
C. Pending Bankruptcy Legislation: The Proposed New Chapter 10 for 
Small Businesses 
Congress recently recognized the need for separate close and 
nonclosely held corporation chapters, and considered new bankruptcy 
legislation which initially proposed that a special chapter for small 
business debtors be temporarily added to the Bankruptcy Code. 193 The 
new chapter, Chapter 10, would have applied only to "small businesses,'"' 
191. !d. at 247. 
192. See supra note 188. 
193. S. 1985 , 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 205 (1992). The bill passed the Senate in 
June, 1992. In October, 1992, the House passed its own version of the legis lation. See 
supra note 179. The House version omitted the proposed new chapter for small debtors 
(and added various new prov isions), as did the reconciled version that ultimately stalled 
in the House. The discussion in the text focuses on the proposed chapter for small 
debtors, as set forth in§ 205(c) of the original Senate bill, and which is likely to reappear 
in some form in future legis lation. Hereinafter, provisions of the proposed new chapter , 
will be cited as uProposed Chapter 10 § . " For a brief chronology of the legislative 
process, see David F. Bantleon & Kathy L. Kresch , A Bankruptcy Law for the '90s, Bus. 
L. TODAY , Jan.-Feb. 1993 , at 25. 
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which the leg islation defined as debtors '"whose aggregate liquidated 
secured and unsecured debts as of the date of the petition do not exceed 
$2,500,000." 194 The legislation appeared to contemplate that a 
disinterested trustee rather than a creditors' committee would represent 
creditors' interests, since the United States Trustee would appoint a 
trustee, but not necessarily a committee, in every case. 195 The drafters 
intended to require that debtors file a plan within ninety days, thus 
addressing the exclusivity problem, 196 and would have permitted small 
businesses to violate absolute priority so long as the plan in question 
"provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable income to be 
received in the 3-year period ... will be applied to make payments under 
the plan. " 197 
The proposal in some respects addressed precisely the problems we 
have identified with Chapter 11 's current network of undifferentiated 
rules. In addition to the important step of recognizing the need for a 
special close corporation chapter, the legislation would have shortened the 
close corporation exclusivity period in exactly the fashion that I have 
advocated. Unhappily, each of the other choices the drafters have made 
for close corporations was questionable at best and potentially 
counterproductive. 
First, the legislation's definition of "small businesses" as debtors 
whose liabilities do not exceed $2,500,000 raises several problems. As 
the analysis above has shown, the definition should focus upon the 
number (or more precisely, concentration) of shareholders, not simply on 
the amount of liabilities, since shareholdership is a far more important 
variable in distinguishing close from nonclosely held debtors. 198 A 
better definition might have emphasized the number of shareholders and 
the absence of public trading of the shares, as the ALI and some states do 
outside of bankruptcy. 199 If the drafters did wish to retain a liability 
194. Proposed Chapter 10 § 1001 (permitting "small business" debtors, as de fmed 
in § 205(a) of the bill, to invoke the proposed new chapter) . An earlier version of the bill 
would have left "small business" debtor la rgely unde fined, suggesting only that the court 
should determine whethe r a debtor's use of proposed Chapter 10 would serve the best 
interests of the estate. The dra fters' decision to revise the definition clearly was a good 
one , g iven among other things the threat o f a reintroduction of the jurisdictional 
maneuverings of the old Bankruptcy Act. 
195. Proposed Chapter 10 § 1003 . 
196 . Proposed Chapter 10 § 1021 . 
197. Proposed Chapter 10 § 1026(b) . 
198. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text . Congress appea rs to have 
mistakenly assumed that the rea l distinction between types of co rporations relates solely 
to volume of business. In actuality, vo lume of business is only a pa rtially accurate proxy 
for the more important di fferences in shareholdershi p and corpo rate governance structure. 
199 . See supra note 173. 
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limitation on access to the chapter, however, they should have 
significantly increased t.~e $2,500,000 ceiling, as many close corporation 
debtors have liabilities far greater t~aJl this amount. 
Second, the substitution of a trustee in place of a creditors' 
committee might have improved on L1e current regime but would 
probably have proved far less effective than the single creditor committee 
that I have proposed. The problem with the trustee approach, aside from 
the caseload burdens that already plague the U.S. Trustee system, is that 
the governmental observer is at best an objective representative (and one 
who, unlike a creditor, would have no familiarity with the debtor at the 
start of the case). Unsecured creditors would be better off if someone 
who has the same financial interest that they have represents them. 200 
Finally, the drafters' proposal to require confirmation of plans that 
dedicate all of the debtor's projected income for the following three years 
to its current creditors would have given far too much flexibility to small 
business debtors. While retention of a limited version of the new value 
exception to absolute priority merits consideration in this context, as I 
have suggested,201 the new legislation goes well beyond this, affording 
many debtors whose situation is in reality hopeless the ability to 
reorganize so long as they promise to pay a hypothetical amount of future 
income under the plan. The effect of the legislation in many cases would 
be simply to postpone further the inevitable liquidation. As a result, the 
drafters' decision to import Chapter 13's "fresh start" policy for 
individuals into the very different context of corporate debtors would have 
increased the cost of credit for all debtors,202 since creditors would 
charge higher interest rates to offset the unnecessary new costs created by 
the new regime. 
In short, in its existing version, the proposal to add Chapter 10 to the 
Bankruptcy Code would have created at least as many problems as it 
might have solved. But Congress's recognition of the need to distinguish 
close corporations from nonclosely held firms offers at least a glimmer of 
hope that the widespread conviction that Chapter 11 is not working will 
lead to more promising changes in the current insolvency regime when 
Congress tries its hand again in upcoming legislative sessions. 
200. Se e, e.g., Rock, s upra note 108, at 503 n .220 (similar problem with 
proposals to appo int a judicial committee to decide whether sha reholders' de rivative suits 
should be pursued). 
2.01. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text. 
202. Cf Bankruptcy Code § 1325(b) (confirmation provi sion n<2rly identical to 
Proposed Chapter 10 § 1026(b)). 
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CONCLUSION 
Corporate bankruptcy reform in this country has in the last century 
occurred at roughiy forty year intervals. Thus, Congress enacted new 
corporate ballirJUptcy laws in 1867, 1898, 1938, and 1978. Recent 
dissatisfaction with the current Bankruptcy Code is sufficiently acute ti-}at 
a proposal to overhaul all aspects of the Code nearly passed Congress this 
year, less than fifteen years since Congress's last effort at reform. 
A growing number of commentators do not believe that simply 
reforming the corporate reorganization provisions is enough and contend 
that the time has come to replace Chapter 11 with an entirely different 
insolvency framework. Unfortunately, none of the current proposals 
adequately balances the desirability of more cost effective proceedings and 
less judicial intervention in asset deployment decisions, on the one hand, 
with the importance of judicial involvement for monitoring and discovery 
purposes, on the ot}Jer. 
This does not mean that Chapter i 1 should be retained in anything 
like its current form, however. Given Chapter 11 's major shortcomings, 
a context-specific, market-miented proposal that also provided a measure 
of judicial oversight would warrant serious consideration. If, on the other 
hand, Chapter 11 remains in place, it should be radically reformed. This 
Article argues for the creation of separate chapters for close and 
nonclosely held corporations, in order to begin the transition to a regime 
with far more context specific rules. 
